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MARKET-MAKERS, MANIPULATORS
AND SHELL GAMES
HARoLD S. BLooMvENTH

*

It should be no news that almost everyone' from the President
of the United States to the smallest shareholder in a mutual fund
prefers rising stock prices. Broker-dealers and corporate officials in
particular have such predilections. Broker-dealers do, for the reason,
among others, that their business is better during periods of rising
prices. Corporate officers do for innumerable reasons including some of
the following: (a) stockholders with paper profits are happy shareholders; those with paper losses may be on the telephone or at the
annual meeting complaining about management; (b) new financing is
relatively easier; (c) a cash offering at higher prices results in less
dilution of equity; (d) the company may exchange its shares for properties or in a corporate acquisition at a lesser dilution price; (e)
officers may sell their stock or pledge their stock as collateral on a more
favorable basis.
With so many persons motivated in the direction of higher prices
it is not surprising that less than legal methods of influencing the
market price are not uncommon events. While they have no corner on
this particular market, broker-dealers and in particular market-makers
have a particular interest in higher prices. The securities business is
a merchandising business which flourishes with rising prices. Presumably, higher prices usually result from general economic conditions,
favorable developments relating to specific companies, increased investor interest in purchasing securities generally and other factors
over which no dealer has control. In other instances the direction
of prices in particular securities are affected by practices illegal or
questionable including the following: (a) a planned series of purchases
at rising prices; (b) fictitious quotations in the over-the-counter market;
(c) arbitrary quotations established by a dominant market-maker; (d)
false or misleading statements concerning an issuer; (e) recommendations by a dealer without an adequate basis; and (f) "merchandising"
* Professor of Law, Northwestern School of Law of Lewis and Clark College. B.S.,
Marshall College, 1942; LL.B., Duke University, 1947; J.S.D., Yale University, 1950.
1There are exceptional instances in which manipulators are interested in depressing
prices. This is likely, for example, when the manipulator is attempting to obtain control
of a company. A broker-dealer with a substantial short position in a security may also be
motivated in the direction of lower prices. For cases involving attempts to depress the market price of a security, see notes 158, 159 infra.
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a security by concentrating retail sales efforts on a particular security.
The juxtaposition of the terms in the title of this article is deliberate;
not because all market-makers are manipulators engaged in a shell
game, but because there are sufficient numbers so engaged to give rise
to concern about the integrity of the markets in many securities.
If the securities business is a merchandising business, one may ask
from where does the merchandise come? In many instances it is selected from among the many available securities on the basis of a
disinterested objective analysis of the company's merit and potential.
In other instances it is selected because the dealer "merchandising"
the security, participated in a prior underwriting of the security. In
still other instances because many companies have difficulty in obtaining access to trading markets, the dealer in a position to make a market
in a security can obtain some type of special inducement for "merchandising" the particular security. The shell corporation, of which
much has been said of late, is often an indirect means of attaining
access to a trading market and affords some dealers their merchandise.
On July 7, 1970, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in
Chasins v. Smith, Barney Sc Co., 2 rendered a decision which constituted
the first judicial recognition of the inherent conflicts of interest that
abound in the area of "merchandising" securities. The reverberations
of that decision throughout the securities industry were such that the
court on March 2, 1971, withdrew its initial opinion and substituted a
modified version which restricts somewhat its holding but leaves intact the basic thrust of the decision. 3 The court's modification appears
to be predicated on a representation made as amicus curiae by the
Securities and Exchange Commission that it has the general problem
of the role of the market-maker in retail markets under study and
expects at long last to propose a rule in this area. This article is an
attempt to examine that role within the broad framework of manipulative practices that interfere with the ideal of a free, competitive securities market.
Tm OvER-THE-COUNTER

MARKET

It is the individual decision of innumerable broker-dealers engaged in the trading of unlisted securities to make a market in individual securities that gives rise to an over-the-counter market. The
over-the-counter market consists of approximately 4,500 dealers who
2 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,712 (2d Cir. July 7, 1970),
modified, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. $ 92,962 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 1971).
8 See discussion commencing at 610 infra.
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are members of the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD)
and approximately 400 non-member dealers. Many dealers are strictly
retail dealers, in the sense that they make no primary markets in a
security, but merely fill customers' orders by buying or selling for the
customer from or to other dealers who make primary markets. Such
broker-dealers may act as principals, in which event they buy from
or sell to their customer, but rely on purchases or sales, as the case may
be, from or to other dealers to complete such transactions. Other
dealers are strictly dealers' dealers - that is, they buy and sell securities
only from and to other dealers. These dealers are making a primary
wholesale market in the particular securities they trade. Still other
dealers make primary markets and retail the same securities to their
customers.
We know something of the composition in terms of numbers of
broker-dealers who make markets as a result of the Special Study
group's analysis. 4 The Special Study group reported that in early 1962
there were about 1,100 broker-dealer firms which could be classified
as wholesale dealers making markets in securities. The Study found
that wholesale over-the-counter activity is concentrated in a relatively
small number of firms, mostly located in New York City; twenty-five
market-makers (seventeen in New York City) accounting for about
50 percent of the total volume of trade by all wholesalers with other
dealers.
The following description of wholesale trading is taken from the
Special Study Report:
Because there is no central location where public orders can be
collected, matched and executed, the wholesale dealer is the key
firm in the over-the-counter markets. He "makes the market" by
advertising his willingness to buy or sell securities for his own account with the expectation of buying at his bid and selling at his
offer. There is a wholesale market in a particular security if a
broker-dealer stands ready to buy from and sell to other brokerdealers at his quoted prices in amounts at least equivalent to the
security's recognized trading unit. Whereas in most exchange stocks
only one specialist makes a market, there may be a score of competing wholesale dealers -

but there need not be any -

bidding

for and offering an over-the-counter security ....
The over-the-counter market is linked together by a teletype system,
private wires, and the telephone. Although transactions are effectuated
4 SEC, REPORT OF SPECAL STUDY OF SEcurrEs MAETS, H.R. Doc.
SPECiAL STUDY R-PORT].

1st Sess., pt. 2, at 550 (1963) [hereinafter SEC
5 d. 554.

No. 95, 88th Cong.,
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and quotations obtained by such means of communication, it is the
National Daily Quotation Sheets, popularly known as the pink sheets
because of their color, that are the basis for much of this traffic. Published daily (on business days) by a private organization and subscribed to by most over-the-counter dealers, it is available in three
sections - Eastern, Midwestern, and Pacific.6 Subscribing dealers
daily place quotations in the sheets for securities in which they trade.
Such quotations usually include bid and ask prices, but sometimes
they are merely in the form of OW (offer wanted) and BW (bid
wanted). Occasionally the dealer indicates the number of shares he is
willing to sell or buy, but more often the size of the market is not indicated. While fictitious quotations are prohibited in theory, generally
there is no effective way to determine from the sheets the size of the
dealer's market. The sheets are often used by dealers inserting quotes
who are merely looking for a buyer or seller for one small block of
stock, but more often they are employed by dealers making a primary
market to inform other dealers of their market. There may be from
one to several dealers quoting a market in a particular security on a
given day. Subscribing dealers use their daily copy to determine who is
making a market in a particular security, to determine the best apparent market in the security, and to compare their market with that
of other dealers.
The sheets are not, for the most part, available to the general
public although some sophisticated investors, particularly institutional
investors, may have access to same. Rather, John Q. Public depends
upon quotes received from his broker or what he reads in the newspaper. Newspaper quotations are generally a result of the NASD retail
quotation system which supplies a national list, four regional lists and
supplemental local lists. The NASD makes available daily to news
media for the quoted securities a representative interdealer bid and a
representative interdealer ask price - that is, in effect a representative
wholesale (interdealer) quotation. In theory, disregarding the dynamic
aspect of market prices, a purchaser of a security in the over-the-counter
market purchasing on a principal basis could check the price he paid
(or is quoted) against the current newspaper quotation and determine
the approximate mark-up (or mark-down if he is a seller) realized by
the dealer.
We are on the eve of a new system of quotations for the over-the6Generally each section will carry quotations for securities primarily traded in the
particular geogaphic area. It is not uncommon, however, for a dealer to subscribe to more
than one section.
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counter market which should make available to the market some of the
benefits of a centralized marketplace. The National Association of Securities Dealers has just made available to subscribing members an automated quotation system. Market-makers will enter their bid and asked
quotations into computers which can be queried by retail dealers
through their own office facilities receiving for the queried security the
market-makers' current bid and asked quotes. The retail dealer will
then contact directly the particular firm it chooses in order to arrange
the transaction. It is expected that 2,000-3,000 stocks will be entered
during start-up, but ultimately 20,000 over-the-counter securities are
7
expected to be handled by the system.
We can illustrate the mechanics of effectuating an order in the
over-the-counter market. Customer A contacts his broker, ABC Company, and places an order to buy 100 shares of XYZ Corporation common stock. ABC Company only retails securities and acts as its customer's agent. ABC Company may have a direct telephone line to a
trader at the Dog Company, a wholesale dealer located in the same
city, connecting to Dog Company's automatic call distributor. An
automatic call distributor is a telephone switchboard by which the
Dog Company trader can contact and be contacted directly by other
firms or institutional investors. The ABC Company employee may
have first consulted the pink sheets to determine that Dog Company
does make a market in the particular security or may have been aware
of this fact as a result of prior transactions. In any event, at this point
the ABC Company employee receives a quotation from the Dog
Company trader and if the order is a market order (or within the price
range limits imposed by the customer) verbal confirmations to be followed by witten confirmations are exchanged. ABC Company then
confirms to its customer that it has purchased, as the customer's agent,
100 shares of XYZ Corporation stock at a specified price and adds on
its commission." In some instances Dog Company may not actually
make the market but may have direct telephone line communications
7 TIrM, Feb. 22, 1971, at 87, reports the system on stream with 750 leading brokers as
subscribers. According to the article, it was developed at a cost of $23 million and gives
instant readings on TV-like consoles on 2,374 of the most actively traded over-the-counter
stocks with another 200 to be added immediately. Eventually as many as 20,000 of the

approximately 50,000 over-the-counter stocks may be included, according to the Time
story. See note 98 infra, for further description of the system.
8 If the dealer chooses to act as principal, the transaction will not be immediately
consummated. Rather the market-maker will give the dealer a quote which is firm for
a few minutes and the dealer will then contact his customer and use that quote as a basis
upon which to add his mark-up to reach the price quoted to the customer. If the price
is acceptable to the customer, the dealer calls the market-maker back and confirms the

transaction verbally thus completing essentially a riskless transaction.
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with its correspondent in another city (perhaps, New York City)
which makes such a market and furnishes the inquiring broker with
the New York firm's quotations. In such event, the local firm executes
the order but the confirmation comes directly from the wholesale
dealer who compensates the transmitting correspondent by payment
of a small service fee. 9
How

TRADING DEVELOPS

It will be helpful to explore the circumstances under which
securities are initially traded in the over-the-counter market. We may,
for purposes of illustration, assume a moderate sized and reasonably
well-established close corporation that makes the decision to go public.
Under favorable circumstances, e.g., a typical "hot issue" market, it
may not have any difficulty in finding a well-established (also a relative
term in the light of many recent failures)'0 brokerage house to underwrite the issue on a firm basis. With widespread dealer participation
throughout the country, the securities may be distributed among a
substantial number of purchasers. The principal underwriter ordinarily feels an obligation to make a market in the security; in any
event, it is good business for him to do so as a large number of the
firm's customers will have purchased the security and will be looking
to the firm to act as a market-maker and thus provide them liquidity.
Of course, the underwriting terms may have sweetened his desire to
make such a market as the firm may have acquired either options or
cheap stock as additional underwriting compensation.." Assuming a
9 Not to be confused with the practice of interpositioning which involves the deliberate placing of one or more dealers between the dealer executing the order and the
market-maker. The usual purpose of such arrangements are to compensate the interpositioned dealer for reciprocal business of another type. The practice of interpositioning
results in the customer paying unnecessary charges for the execution and, in some instances, executions at a somewhat higher (if a purchase) price then the best price available. For these reasons, among others, the practice has been held by the Commission to
violate sections 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act. See Thomson & McKinnon, SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310 (May 8, 1968).
10 These failures led to the adoption of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation
Act of 1970, Act of Dec. 30, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-598, 84 Stat. 1636. The Act establishes
the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), a federally chartered non-profit
membership corporation, which will provide protection for the accounts of customers of
brokers and dealers and members of national securities exchanges who get into financial
difficulty. All registered broker-dealers and members of national securities exchanges are
automatically members of SIPC unless exempt under the Act (the exemptions being very
limited). The insurance feature will be funded largely by an assessment based upon member dealers' gross revenues. For a brief description, see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9064 (Jan. 22, 1971).
11 The Blue-Sky Laws of several states restrict somewhat the extent to which cheapstock and options may be issued to underwriters. See generally Bloomenthal, Blue Sky
Regulation and The Theory of Overkill, 15 WAYNE L. REv. 1447 (1969). In addition, such
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large number of shareholders, a significant amount of trading may be
expected in the security and other dealers with local or other interest
in the security may also make a competing market.
If we assume a less well-established company -perhaps,
one in
the promotional and development stage, the securities may have been
offered directly by the company or pursuant to a best efforts underwriting by a relatively small brokerage firm or the securities may have
just trickled out over a period of time to members of the public. If
there was an original underwriter, it may not have the resources or
know-how to make a market in the security or it may now be out of
business. The company may have a sufficient number of shareholders
to warrant a trading market and may have made sufficient progress to
have stimulated interest in its shares. Ideally a trading market should
develop for its shares at this particular point; however, it is naive to
assume that such a market will ordinarily spring into existence without
someone taking the initiative. Assuming progress to the point described
above, it may, nonetheless, not be easy to come by a trading market. A
trading market assumes one or more dealers prepared to make a market and such dealers often expect to be paid a price for making a
market. What that price is may depend upon what the dealer is able
to extort and the dealer's own concept of respectability. In any event,
it may involve access to the company's shareholder's list; daily advice
as to transfers; preferential access to information; membership on the
company's board; the company's cooperation in distributing information about the company; a block of cheap stock or access to an available
supply of stock or what have you. In fact, most market-makers regard
what they are doing as being of some value to the company and may
demand one price or another (often willingly paid) - some legal12 and
others illegal or questionable in this legal nether land -in return for
making a market in this context. The close relationship that may develop between the company and dealer under these circumstances is
illustrated by the not atypical remark of one dealer that "[v]irtually
every aspect of the company's operations were discussed with me."'13
The situation seeps with potential for securities violations.
indirect compensation is subject to review under procedures established by the National
Association of Securities Dealers for its members. See CCH NASD MANUAL
2151.02
(1970). See also May & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8975 (Sept. 8, 1970).
12 Access to inside information if improperly utilized is clearly illegal. See note 123
and accompanying text infra. See also note 17 infra, as to typical requirements in an underwriting agreement directed to the probability that the principal underwriter will make
a secondary market after the initial distribution.
13 See Levine v. SEC, 436 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir. 1971).
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Let us say some frank things about trading markets. In many
instances unlike Topsy they don't just develop. A trading market
depends not only upon a significant number of shareholders, but also
on sufficient interest in the security. Interest in a security doesn't necessarily just happen; it often happens because of dissemination of information. The more favorable the information, the more interest. The
more dealers disseminating the information to their customers, the
more interest. Dealers with a large "go-go" clientele can generate more
interest than others. None of this justifies the dissemination of false,
misleading or otherwise fraudulent material. It does point up the fact
that without the right people (dealers) generating, through the dissemination of information, interest in a company, the probability of
an active trading market in many companies' securities is a remote one.
On what bases do market-makers make a decision to make a
market in a security? There is scant empirical evidence available. The
Special Study did note that "some wholesale dealers consider it an acceptable business practice to receive allotments of 'hot issues' at the
public offering price, cheap stock or options as an inducement to make
a trading market for a security."' 14 Noting that the NASD had adopted
rules pertaining to "hot issues," the study went on to point out that
"without official NASD expression of general standards or guidelines
in this area, wholesale dealers have been largely free to treat the matter of commencing trading markets on this kind of motivation as being
left to their discretion in light of their own business standards."' 5 On
the other hand, as to integrated firms (those engaging in both wholesale and resale business), the study observed "that the trading activities ... have become of increasing importance in the wholesale markets. This fact is attributable, in part, to the large number of new
issues offered publicly in recent years, in which the managing underwriter has often become the principal market-maker for the issue.
".,6 The study went on to point out that
many integrated firms
having underwritten an issue feel the responsibility to sponsor the
trading market so as "to maintain a continuous market in securities in
7
which it has placed its customers."'
14 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT,

pt. 2, at 568.

15 Id.

161d. 578.
17Id. 585. Underwriting agreements often include provisions designed to facilitate
the making of a secondary market requiring the issuer to deliver to the principal underwriter for a specified period, e.g., five years, all financial statements, all general communications (reports, letters etc.) with shareholders, all documents furnished to the SEC, annual
shareholder lists, and advice sheets showing daily transfer of shares.
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One way to create a demand for a security and, hence, dealer
interest is for a company to attract the attention of some of the 13,000
or more financial analysts. Arranging a presentation to a group of
analysts is not feasible for many relatively unseasoned companies except, perhaps, during periods of unusual speculative activity. The
Financial Analysts Federation (with a claimed membership of 13,000)
will permit a company for a fee of $500.00 per year to make unlimited
use of its membership mailing list. Companies subscribing to this
service must furnish a brief description of the literature to be distributed along with the purpose of the mailing and the particular mailing
must be approved by the Federation.
There is at least one organization offering its services for a fee
in arranging for or expanding secondary markets for issuers.' 8 This
company writes a prospective client as follows:
With your shares continuing to sell far below true values, we
thought you might be interested in taking corrective action. We
are specialists in this field, and would welcome an opportunity to
serve your company - to the end that higher prices and broader
markets be attained .... [We have] long specialized in developing
broad and active markets in the shares of deserving corporations.
Through our contacts with more than four hundred broker-dealers from coast to coast, we have been successful in generating substantial interest in our clients' stocks. This has often led to such
securities doubling or trebling in price.., our fees are moderate
in terms of the benefits that may be expected.
CONTROLLED AND DOMINATED

"MERCHANDISING"

MAR.XETS-

SECURrTIES

The phenomena of the sponsor broker and the limited availability of markets for many securities give rise to markets with a sole
or dominant market-maker. The Special Study noted that "[flor many
securities in the over-the-counter markets, there may be a limited
number of dealers - if any - actively making a market." 19 The Study
alluded to the foregoing fact as "one of the most important facts about
over-the-counter markets as a broad category." 20 In 1960, this author
directed attention to some of the legal and economic problems that can
Is For discussion of the legality of some of the practices suggested by the excerpt set
forth, see notes 116, 147 and accompanying text infra. The fact that the shares may,
in someone's opinion, be undervalued is no defense to a violation of the anti-manipulation provisions. See Halsey, Stuart & Co., 80 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949).
19 SEC SPEcAL STUDY REPoRT, pt. 2, at 587.
20 Id.
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arise in this context 21 and it is not the purpose of this article to rehash
what was said there although, in fact, with one exception,22 not much
that is relevant has occurred since that time. The Commission's staff
continues to base its cases in this area on a statistical non-analytical
approach: participation by a dealer in a large percentage of the trading transactions in a particular security during a given period of time
constitutes control and domination. 23 Failure to disclose control and
domination constitutes a violation of the antifraud provisions.2 4 One
of the principal problems with this approach is that it fails to recognize the widespread extent of control and dominated markets in these
terms and gives the staff almost "willy nilly" discretion to select its few
targets. In fact, those targets generally involve situations in which the
staff has other reasons for wanting to put the broker-dealer out of
business, the most persuasive of which is the fact that its retail staff
has been actively "merchandising" the security with the aid of ir25
responsible representations.
One of the evils of a market with a sole and dominant marketmaker, as observed by the Special Study, is the fact that investors may
not realize that the very marketability of his security depends upon a
single broker-dealer's willingness (and ability) to continue to make a
market in the security.2 6 The Special Study suggested that "[i]f investors had access to reliable information as to the number and identity of the broker-dealers making independent markets ...at least the
wary investor would be alerted and in a position to protect himself at
an earlier point .... -27 The Study also noted that in this type of
market, the market-maker is often also actively retailing the security
and that "[t]he retail prices of a sole or dominant market-maker are
not affected by competition but may be affected by the firm's own
activity at the retail level." 28 Some of the premises inherent in this
conclusion may be arguable, but it points up the real problem in this
area - the "merchandising" of securities tied to a market made in part
21 Bloomenthal, The Case of the Subtle Motive and the Delicate Art-Control and
Domination in Over-The-Counter Securities Markets, 1960 DuKE LJ. 196.
22 See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. RP.
92,962 (2d Cir. Mar. 2,
1971), discussed at 610 infra.
23 Compare discussion in Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 204, with the cases discussed
in note 41 infra.
24 See Sterling Sec. Co., 39 S.E.C. 487 (1959), and note 41 infra. The Commission's
earlier dicta that the over-the-counter specialist by effecting a high percentage of the
transactions in the security does not necessarily illegally control and dominate the market
has been conveniently disregarded. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C. 865, 874-75 (1946).
25 See cases discussed in note 41 infra.
26 SEC SPEciAL SrUDY .EIr'QRT, pt. 2, at 588.
27 Id. 589.

8 Id. 588,
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(if not, in large part) by the merchandising dealer. The Second Circuit
in Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 29 has recently taken judicial cognizance of the inherent conflicts involved in this type of situation.
There are, in fact, several situations involving the "merchandising" of securities all of which, in the author's judgment, pose similar
and serious problems requiring special attention. By "merchandising"
is meant simply special sales efforts often accompanied by aboveaverage selling commissions for the salesmen. The most apparent
example is the typical distribution of securities in a conventional underwriting. Commissions are normally well above those earned in
trading markets and the involved dealers normally concentrate their
efforts on distributing their allotment. The apparatus for this purpose
is well-developed and in most instances relatively efficient. The special
protections available in this area involve the registration of the security,
the delivery of a prospectus and the slowing down of the process necessitated by the registration procedures.3 0 In other instances "merchandising" may involve the distribution of a large block of stock which
does not require registration, but which involves special sales effort.
The large block may, for example, have been acquired and is now
being sold by an institutional investor. The Special Study recommended, but the Commission never adopted a rule requiring special
31
(but limited) disclosures in this context.
Another area of "merchandising" and the one with respect to
which we are most concerned involves the integrated dealer whose retail sales force is encouraged to make a special effort to dispose of a
particular security. The motivation for this "merchandising" may be
varied - the dealer may have an assured source of supply, the dealer
may own a block of stock or warrants, the dealer may be merely interested in trading profits, the dealer may share the company's interest
in an active market at rising prices as the dealer expects to undertake
further financing for the company or to arrange acquisitions for the
company or the like. Unlike the registration process, there is no
92,962 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 1971). See discussion of this case
29 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
commencing at 610 infra.
30 On the distribution of securities, see generally 1 L. Loss, Sacuarrias RFGULA&TON
212-90 (2d ed. 1961, Supp. 1969) [hereinafter Loss]; H. BLooMErmTHAJ, SEcuartnss LAw ch.
7 (1966).
31 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT,

pt. 1, at 569-70. The Special Study recommended requiring that a broker-dealer effecting an unregistered distribution be required to file with
the Commission a brief notification as to the amount of securities being offered; offering
price and underwriting arrangement; source of the securities and whether stabilizing
transactions are to be effected. Included in the definition of a distribution were sales of
securities of such size to require payment of compensation exceeding normal compensation
for routine transactions in similar securities.
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mechanism for slowing down the process and making information
available directly to prospective investors. Rather, decisions are likely
to be made on the basis of a telephone call which requires immediate
execution and in an aura of puffing if not outright fraud. If the stock
is sufficiently speculative, the dealer sufficiently disreputable and the
number of telephones employed sufficiently large this type of operation
may be characterized as a boiler-room. In fact, it is only a question of
degree that distinguishes the boiler-shop from many respectable members of the brokerage community. This may account in part for the
fact that the Commission has never adopted the rule it proposed relating to so-called boiler-rooms. 32
The Commission attacks the problems outlined in a variety of
ways including the following:
(a) The control and domination approach -alleging a violation of
the antifraud provisions because of failure to disclose the dealer's
dominant position in the market. The basis for such a case is the
typical trading quiz33 that the staff may run which will establish during a specified period the percentage of interdealer and other transactions handled by the respondent dealer. At some point if the
percentage is high enough this becomes control and domination.
(b) A variation of the foregoing approach is to establish that the
magnitude of transactions engaged in by the dealer in the particular
security amounts to a distribution. If a distribution (even one not
requiring registration) is involved, then rule 1Ob-6 automatically comes
into play which makes it a manipulative device for a dealer while engaged in a distribution to purchase or even bid for securities of the
same class.3 4 If, as is the case with respect to our hypothetical situation,
the dealer is making a market in the security, it is obviously purchasing
and bidding for the security in violation of the foregoing rule. The
proof in this instance is again largely statistical and supplied by a
trading quiz - the fact that the dealer has distributed (sold), during
a relatively short period of time, a substantial block of securities,
32 For a case in which the Commission characterized the activities of the brokerdealer as a boiler-room operation, see B. Fennekohl & Co., 41 S.E.C. 210 (1962). Rule
15c2-6 proposed by the Commission in 1962, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6885 (Aug. 16, 1962), but not adopted, would have made it unlawful for a broker or
dealer to use the telephone to offer or sell certain low-priced equity securities of the type
often the subject of boiler-room operations.
33 For cases setting forth the results of a trading quiz inquiry, see Sterling Sec. Co.,
59 S.E.C. 487 (1959); S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950). Presumably, computerized
technology permits the Commission to now maintain a better surveillance of unusual movements in market prices. See 36 SEC ANN. Ra. 94 (1970).
34 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1970).
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establishes the violation.35 Again, as in the control and domination
situation, it is largely a question of which dealers the staff chooses to
make as its target.
(c) A third approach is to establish that the dealer distributed false
or misleading statements. This type of case can often be proved, but
may require a more thorough investigation and a greater degree of
proof than the two situations outlined above. 36 Accordingly, it may be
easier in this context to rely on the position that the dealer did not
have an adequate basis for making the recommendations in question.
In such event the mere fact of recommendation and lack of available
information establishes the case.37
(d) A fourth approach is to establish a manipulation in classical
terms - that is, engaging in a series of transactions at rising prices for
the purpose of creating the appearance of activity and unloading shares
owned directly (or in fictitious accounts) 38 at the manipulated price. 30
This type of case may be relatively difficult to prove, but some manipulations are so crudely undertaken that the staff has no difficulty in
40
proving these charges.
The following excerpts from two Commission opinions4' are il35 See J.H. Goddard 9. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4,
1965); Bruns, Nordeman 9- Co., 40 S.E.C. 652 (1961).
36 Levine v. SEC, 436 F-2d 88 (2d Cir. 1971); rule 15cl-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-2

(1970).
37 See cases cited in note 116 infra.
38 For an example of a case involving the use of fictitious names for the issuance of
securities, see SEC v. Globus Int'l. Ltd., 320 F. Supp. 158 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), in which
100,000 shares were allegedly issued in the names of 100 fictitious persons including one
"Potter Stewart."
39 See cases cited in note 53 infra.
40 See, e.g., Charles C. Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190 (1938).
41 The excerpts set forth are respectively from Shearson, 1{ammill & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7743 (Nov. 12, 1965), and from J.H. Goddard & Co., SEC
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7618 (June 4, 1965). The Commission had earlier
acknowledged that all market-makers who effect a high percentage of the transactions in a
security "to some extent dominates the market in" the security, but, nonetheless, do not
necessarily thereby violate the federal securities laws. Norris & Hirshberg, Inc., 21 S.E.C.
865, 874-75 (1946). For a rather unsuccessful attempt to determine how the Commission's
staff draws the line in this area, see Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 205-10. In Norris-Hirshberg, the Commission talked about the substitution of "a private system of pricing for the
" 21 S.E.C. at 881. Yet,
collective judgment of buyers and sellers in an open market ....
a dominant market-maker cannot substitute an arbitrary price for long unless he is prepared to accumulate a substantial position in the market or unless he is in a position to generate demand through the use of his retail sales force. It is the latter possibility that, in
the author's judgment, is more likely to interfere with the collective judgment of buyers
and sellers. See discussion at note 166 and accompanying text infra. Interestingly enough,
in exchange markets so-called specialists are expected to provide (and are criticized for
failing to provide) orderly markets by buying or selling against the general trend of the
"collective judgment." See SEC SpECIAL STUDY REPoRT, pt. 2, at 96-121. One writer has
achieved best-seller status by charging that a specialist should have a license to manipulate.
R. NxY, Tm WALL STREr JUNGLE (1970).
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lustrative of control and dominated markets as viewed by the Commission:
[Case No. 1:] Registrant's opening bid for USAMCO stock in
the sheets on November 14, 1960 was 8. Thereafter, throughout the
remainder of 1960 and the first half of 1961, registrant entered
daily quotations in the sheets at generally increasing prices ...
From November 14, 1960 until the end of 1961, registrant made
the principal or sole market in USAMCO stock. Through November 30, 1961, registrant as principal sold 312,449 shares, including
76,098 shares to dealers and purchased 311,117 shares, including
104,291 shares from dealers. As agent for customers, registrant purchased 66,312 shares and sold 83,910 shares. Although other brokerdealers published quotations in the sheets from time to time during
the period, the role of such firms was in general not significant....
Registrant was both the primary wholesale and retail dealer in
USAMCO stock, and the market for that stock was dependent upon
registrant's continued sales efforts ... after the salesmen were instructed in September 1961 to cease soliciting buy orders from
customers, the market in the stock collapsed ...
[Case No. 2:] During the entire period from December 11,
1961 . . . through December 1962, registrant inserted quotations
for the stock in the sheets on all but 11 business days, was the high
bidder 86 times, and was equal to the high bidder 96 times. Of the
94 times that the high bid was raised by dealers, registrant raised
it 39 times independently of other dealers and 22 times at the same
time... other dealers did so... in the period between December
1961 and April 1963, registrant purchased a total of about 390,000
shares of USLIC stock, and sold 360,000 shares of which 806,000
shares were sold to retail customers. Other firms during the period
traded at least 244,000 shares, with very little retail selling . . .
[selling] almost all shares purchased from dealers or customers
either to registrant or to other dealers who in turn sold them to
registrant. Thus registrant was both the primary wholesale purchaser and the primary retail seller of USLIC stock and the market
for that stock was dependent upon registrant's continued retail
sales effort ...
A hopeful development in terms of policing the "merchandising"
of securities by market-makers is reflected in the Second Circuit decision in the Chasins case. In fact, this decision contains in embryonic
form the first realistic approach to the problem and tends to vindicate
the wisdom of the Supreme Court in sanctioning private actions generally under the securities laws since the most fruitful development
after thirty-eight years of experience in the general area has come from
private counsel rather than the professional administrators. Involved
were four transactions in which Smith, Barney & Co. sold as principal
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for its own account securities of four unrelated companies to Chasins in
the over-the-counter market. Smith, Barney had acted as underwriter
for the distribution of securities of two of the companies and made a
market in all four of the securities. Smith, Barney's representatives had
analyzed the plaintiffs' securities portfolio and had recommended the
purchase of all four of the securities in question. At no time did the
defendant dealer disclose to the plaintiff that it was making a market
in the securities involved. Smith, Barney contended (probably correctly) with the amicus support of the National Association of Securities Dealers and Association of Stock Exchange Firms 42 that no court
had ever required a market-maker to disclose its market-making role.
Further, the defendant contended that in not making such disclosures
it had followed the customary practice of the industry.
The court treated the issue as to whether the defendant broker
in failing to disclose its market-making role failed to disclose a material
fact and thereby violated rule lOb-5. The test of materiality in this
context is whether such disclosure "might have influenced Chasins'
decision to buy the stock." 43 The court's initial opinion concluded
that such knowledge
could well influence a client's decision to buy the securities; 44 disclosure of the fact would indicate the possibility of adverse interests which might be reflected in Smith, Barney's recommendations
....

If over supplied, it may be to the interest of a market-maker

to attempt to unload the securities on his retail clients. Here,
Smith, Barney's strong recommendations of the three securities
Chasins purchased could have been motivated by its own market
position rather than the intrinsic desirability of the securities for
Chasins .... 45
42 See BNA SEcuarras REGuLATioN &-LAw RxPor, Feb. 11, 1970 at A-6. Nonetheless,
the NASD has required since 1964, disclosure in market letters and sales reports of the
fact that the dealer making recommendations in such literature usually makes a market
in the security if such is the case. CCH NASD AMANUAL
2151 (1970).
43 CCH FED. SEc. L. RPx. t 92,962, at 90,558.
44 Compare the language of the opinion as originally issued as set forth in the text
at this point, with the language as modified in the substituted opinion which reads as
follows: "knowledge of the additional fact of market making by Smith, Barney in the
three securities recommended could well influence the decision of a client in Chasins'
position depending on the broker-dealer's undertaking to analyze and advise whether to
follow its recommendation .. " Id. (emphasis added).
45 [196 9 -1 970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,712, at 99,187. Language

in the text is as set forth in the withdrawn opinion; the introductory clause being replaced by the language noted in note 44 supra, with the balance of the statement being
retained. Although not specifically referred to, a market-maker has similar motives when
it finds itself in a short position, i.e., it has sold more stock than it has purchased. In
such a situation the market-maker has a motive to depress the price of stock and could
achieve this purpose by recommending to customers its sale.
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Not surprisingly, the court cited in support of its decision the Supreme
Court decision in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.4 6 in
which the Court found that a defendant registered investment adviser who published a newsletter with stock recommendations violated
the fraud provisions of the securities laws in failing to disclose that he
had a significant position in the securities being recommended. Elsewhere in determining the appropriate measure of damages the court
in Chasins referred to the fact that the evil in this context "is that
recommendations to clients will be based upon the best interests of
47
the dealer rather than the client."
On petition for rehearing the court denied the petition as well as
a request for rehearing en banc. The original panel (Smith, Kaufman
and Hays), however, modified its opinion in one respect so as to emphasize that in determining that failure to disclose the recommending
dealer's market status could have influenced the purchaser's decision to
buy the security it was attaching particular significance to the fact
that the broker-dealer had made a written evaluation of the plaintiff's
portfolio and made recommendations for further purchases knowing
that the client would rely on the recommendations. The court in its
modified opinion, stated: "In this situation failure to inform the customer fully of its possible conflict of interest, in that it was a marketmaker in the securities which it strongly recommended for purchase
by him, was an omission of a material fact. .... 48 The court then went
on to note that the Commission has under consideration a proposed
rule which would cover the general area of appropriate disclosures for
various types of market-makers.
Three members (Friendly, Lumbard and Moore) of the full
court dissented from the decision denying the request for rehearing
en banc. It is apparent from this opinion written by Judge Friendly
that if the three had constituted the panel deciding the case that they
would have reached a contrary result. Judge Friendly refers to the
opinion in the principal case as being "predicated on an essential misconception of the role of the market-maker in over-the-counter transactions. . .. "49 The Friendly opinion suggests that this role is generally
46875 U.S. 180 (1968).
92,712, at 99,138. The court
47 [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
allowed damages based upon the difference between the amount paid and the price at
which the securities were sold where the sale took place before plaintiff became aware
of defendant's violation of the Exchange Act. A measure of this nature could prove to be
an effective deterrent as it in effect makes the broker-dealer an insurer against loss if he
fails to make the appropriate disdosure to an "innocent" purchaser.
92,962, at 90,558.
48 CCH FE. Sac. L. RaP.
49 Id. at 90,561 (dissenting opinion).
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a benign one and that the fear a market-maker who buys as well as
sells is likely to be interested in palming off a stock is an unreal one.
Judge Friendly also takes exception to the retroactive application of
what he views as essentially a new principle and expresses the fear
that the decision "will encourage many suits by other speculators who
have suffered losses." 50
Tm CLAssIcAL MANIPULATION

Once upon a time a financial adviser advised his client (SP) as
follows:
SP should advance continually the market price of its shares from
the prolonged, rather static range in the low 30's .... Such advance should be implemented by SP or one or more of its officials
on its behalf, by purchasing shares of SP on the open market on
the ASE. The relatively small floating supply of shares ... should
make a relatively easy job of continually advancing SP's market
price and such advance will be assisted substantially (if not taken
over in a major way from time to time by the investing public and
brokerage fraternity) when it becomes apparent through publicity
and market action that SP has entered on an accelerated expansion program .... The shares purchased . . . can, of course, be

used in negotiating future property acquisitions ....r,

The Court in denying the investment adviser his claimed $1,000,000
fee suggested that in drafting his plan the financial adviser appeared
to model it on what is prohibited by section 9(a)(2) of the ExchangeAct.52 In fact, the adviser had described a classical manipulation of
purchasing shares in a series of transactions at rising prices thereby
inducing others, in the belief the market is going up, to purchase
shares.
The basic manipulative scheme described above sometimes accompanied by prohibited wash transactions and matched orders has
been the traditional technique of the manipulator. 3 In the case of
over-the-counter securities it is often facilitated by broker-dealers placing arbitrarily determined quotations in the national daily quotation
sheets;5 4 quotations which often are either fictitious in the sense that
5oId.at 90,562.
51 Davis v. Pennzoil Co., 438 Pa. 194, 204, 264 A.2d 597, 602 (1970).
52 Id. at 206-07, 264 A.2d at 603. While section 9(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 781(a)(2) (1964),
is limited to listed securities, the court held that the described plan also violated rule
lOb-5 which is applicable to both listed and unlisted securities.
53 See Thornton v. SEC, 171 F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1948); Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89
(2d Cir. 1940); RJ. Koeppe & Co. v. SEC, 95 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1938). See also Crane Co.
v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
54 See, e.g., SEC v. North Am.Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970),
discussed at note 70 and accompanying text infra.
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the dealer will back away from them 55 or will purchase shares at the
quoted price only in very limited amounts. 56 In this context the dealer
may be constantly reaching for stock at a higher price by deliberately
57
quoting (and paying) more than is necessary to acquire the stock.
Dealers may be persuaded to enter bids in the sheets at prices higher
than the demand warrants with the knowledge that a particular
dealer will repurchase undisposed shares at a guaranteed, slightly
higher, price from them. 58 As noted by the Tenth Circuit, this type of
activity not only creates an artificial price level but gives the appearance of a broad and active market when in fact there is only one
dealer making the market. 59 An SEC rule now requires dealers placing
quotations in the sheets for other dealers to indicate that such is the
case by an appropriate symbol.60
The classical manipulation can be aided and abetted by the dissemination of false rumors, broker-dealer recommendations and
"merchandising" and by paid-for recommendations by newspaper publishers or writers. The latter practice commonly known as "touting" a
security is specifically unlawful under section 17(b) of the Securities
Act."' Behind a manipulation of the classical type is usually an obvious
motive - the desire of the manipulator to dispose of shares at the
manipulated price.
Establishing a classical manipulation usually involves a trading
quiz as in the case of the controlled and dominated market with emphasis on the role the alleged manipulator's transactions played in
raising the market price of the security. 2 The intention to induce
others to purchase is generally established by inference.6 3 While such
cases are fairly difficult to prove, the Commission in broker-dealer
revocation proceedings may not require too much evidence beyond
motive. Thus, in one case" 4 in which a violation of 9(a)(2) was found,
the broker-dealer for the period involved purchased (or was responsible
pt. 2, at 572.
56 In fact, it is generally assumed that the market-maker need purchase or sell only
a so-called trading unit, generally 100 shares, at his quoted price which in the case of a
low-price security doesn't represent much of a market. See Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B.
Meadows & Co., 318 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
57See, e.g., SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
5s Id.
r9 Id. at 1342.
60 Rule 15c2-7, 17 CI.R. § 240.15c2-7 (1970).
61 15 U.S.C. § 77q(b) (1964). See United States v. Amick, 439. F.2d 351 (7th Cir. 1971).
62 See cases cited in note 53 supra.
63 Thus, the character of the market transactions themselves and the existence of an
option in the manipulator were regarded as sufficient to establish motivation in Charles C.
Wright, 3 S.E.C. 190 (1938), aff'd sub nom. Wright v. SEC, 112 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1940).
64 Mates Fin. Servs., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8836 (Mar. 9, 1970).
55 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT,
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as a result of its recommendations for the purchase of) 151,000 shares
out of a total of 1,169,000 shares traded or approximately 12 2 percent
of all shares purchased. While the stock rose during this period involved from 53/8 to 14, most of the rise occurred on the date of an
announcement by the company of admittedly true and material information. The respondent broker had an obvious motive for attempting to increase the price of stock as it had accumulated a substantial
inventory in the stock for the portfolio of a Fund it managed at
relatively low prices on the basis of material undisclosed information
made available to it by an insider.
THE

SHELL GAME AND VARIATIONS

If you were speculating in uranium stocks during the first uranium
boom (circa 1955), you may have purchased shares of the Jolly
Jack Uranium Company. Offered pursuant to Regulation A, it appealed to many speculators and was fairly widely held and traded in
the over-the-counter securities market. The company never found
uranium and probably exhausted its potential for finding uranium;
it is in effect a dormant corporate shell. There are in fact a large number of such dormant corporate shells each of which at one time had a
substantial number of shareholders and a secondary market for its
securities. Some of them were organized long before 1955 and became
dormant even at an earlier date.6 5 At one time,66 and perhaps even at
the present time, trading continues on one or two of the lesser exchanges in shares of companies listed on that exchange even though
the company for all practical purposes is dormant.
The shell game is by no means a new phenomenon; it has been
with us for many years. In its traditional form, the players in the game
find a dormant company with a large number of shareholders. Through
one means or another they obtain control of such a company - possibly, by buying out the former controlling shareholders or by induc05 In fact, a corporation which had issued stock prior to 1933 has been regarded as
particularly attractive to some promoters on the mistaken assumption that the exemption
for securities issued prior to the enactment of the Securities Act provided for by section
3(a)(1) of that Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(1) (1964), would be available. However, the provision
excluding from the exemption new offerings of such securities by an issuer or underwriter
precludes reliance on the exemption in the usual shell corporation situation. See SEC v.
North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970). For an early case involving
a shell corporation, see S.E.C. v. Mono-Kearsage Consol. Mining Co., [1959-1961 Transfer
90,894. (D. Utah Oct. 8, 1958).
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
66 In the proceeding withdrawing the registration of the San Francisco Mining Exchange as a registered national securities exchange, the Commission noted that of the
forty-two stocks listed, twenty-three had no revenues or revenues of less than $1,000. Some
of the activities described involved the typical shell corporation manipulation. San Francisco Mining Exchange, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7870 (Apr. 22, 1966).
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ing the control group to have the corporation issue a large block of
stock to them in exchange for properties. Properties in any event are
transferred into the dormant shell and rumors commence to circulate
with varying degrees of foundation concerning the properties and the
promoters' plans. Dealer interest is revived in the company and a trading market comes into being based in part on the former dealer and
shareholder interest in the corporation.
The Commission frowns upon the utilization of shell companies
and has used its powers to suspehd trading in over-the-counter securities as a means of discouraging their use, has proposed some special
rules relating to such arrangements,61 and has taken other steps as
we shall see to discourage their use. Yet, some promotors (would-be
corporate organizers) including some reasonably respectable ones 68
have been prepared to pay for the purchase of control of such
corporations even though the corporation's assets are worthless. The
one asset a shell corporation has is a large number of stockholders and,
perhaps, several broker-dealers that formerly made a market in the
company's securities who might be tempted to do so again (because of
the interest of their own customers) if the company were to be revived
by a transfusion of properties. Of course, the promotors could acquire
a constituency of shareholders by organizing a new corporation and
giving away shares to a large number of individuals which is what is
being done in effect when a shell corporation is utilized. Watered
stock problems aside, this would not accomplish the promoter's purposes as the donee shareholders would not be clustered around particular brokers inclined to make a market in the security.
The promoters utilizing shell corporations may be of the traditional type who have the classical manipulation previously described
in mind. In such event the promoters can be expected to bail out as
soon as they succeed in raising the price of the stock. The Commission's
staff likes to make the assumption (and not wholly without reason)
that this is the usual situation. Nonetheless, in other instances, they may
be well-intentioned but naive and poorly advised individuals who are
willing to pay this sort of price (that is, give away part of the corporation's equity) in order to have access to an instant market in their
security. The motivation for seeking such a market rather than fraud
See discussion at note 94 and accompanying text infra.
68 In the fall of 1969, Gulf and Western Industries, Inc., a well known conglomerate
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, spun-off as a dividend to its shareholders shares
in a newly organized subsidiary. See BNA SECURITIS REGULATION & LAw REPORT, Aug. 20,
1969, at B-1. See also discussion at note 89 and accompanying text infra, for the spin-off
variation of the shell corporation.
67

1971]

MARKET-MAKERS

may be the normal reasons for seeking a secondary market and a
recognition of the obstacles to access to such a market through conventional channels. The scope of activity (at least prior to the Commission's hard-line policies) in shell corporations is illustrated by the
fact that between July 15, 1969 and October 10, 1969, twenty-five different advertisements offering to purchase shell corporations appeared
in the Wall Street Journal. During the same period, nineteen advertisements in the same journal sought to sell shell corporations. 69
The shell game of the fraudulent variety is vividly described in
Judge Medina's Second Circuit opinion in S.E.C. v. North American
Research and Development Corp. 70 A triumvirate of Canadian promoters sought and found their corporate shell in Utah - a publiclyheld inactive company named Utah Fortuna Gold Company, 70 to 80
percent of the stock of which was owned by one shareholder. In due
time they had acquired the shares of the controlling shareholders and
others as a result of which they owned approximately 96.8 percent of
the outstanding stock for which they had paid a relatively nominal
cash consideration. They had intended to transfer certain Canadian
mining claims to the shell, but upon learning of the availability of an
unpatented and untested process for producing pollution-free coke
they concluded that such a process would be more appealing to the
imagination of prospective over-the-counter investors and arranged to
acquire this process for the corporation. Changing the name of the
corporation to North American Research and Development Corporation, they then prepared a misleading progress report characterized by
the court as "a slick piece of work, but not slick enough." 71 This report was distributed to a large number of securities firms and was
followed by personal "touting" visitations to many securities dealers.
A Jersey City broker was found who at their instance commenced
quoting the stock at the arbitrarily determined quotation of $214 bid,
$23/4 offered; the price ultimately rose to $6.00. In the meantime the
promoters commenced distributing by way of Toronto, shares destined
problem in finding
ultimately for the United States. The court had no
73
72
violations of registration and fraud provisions.
The Commission had sounded an early warning in July of 1969
69 The cited statistics were taken from a speech given by Hamer Budge, then Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, to the National Security Traders Ass'n,
Oct. 19, 1969, reported in BNA SECURTM-.s REGULATION & LAW REPoRT, Oct. 22, 1969, at X-5.
70 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
71 Id. at 69.

72 Securities Act of 1983 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964).
73 Rule lOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1970).
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to the securities industry, 74 noting that market prices of shell
corporation shares had risen sharply under circumstances bearing no
relationship to the underlying financial condition and business activities of the company. The Commission cautioned broker-dealers to
assure themselves that they have sufficient information about the
issuer and persons effectuating trades so as to avoid violations of the
securities laws. In particular the Commission had in mind the duty of
a dealer to avoid the making of recommendations without a reasonable basis and the duty of a broker-dealer to avoid participation in an
unlawful secondary distribution. The early warning was followed by
a hard-hitting speech of the then Chairman of the Commission, Hamer
H. Budge, delivered on October 19, 1969 to the National Security
Traders Association. Chairman Budge described the shell game in
outspoken terms. He pointed out that it was facilitated by the placing
of quotations in the pink sheets and urged traders to recognize the shell
situation for what it is and to instigate through his firm an investigation
into the affairs of the issuer before engaging in trading. Chairman
Budge continued: "You are the professionals and of all the people in
the industry, you would be the first to recognize a phony stock or a
phony price . . . ." In fact, while not to be attributed to Chairman
Budge, manipulation of a shell corporation stock would be difficult
to accomplish without the active connivance of a trader-dealer. 75 Chairman Budge observed that "[t]he Commission has already developed
and is continuing to develop cases involving nationwide shell distri76
butions by hard-core criminal elements.." '
The Commission has used effectively its power to suspend trading
in over-the-counter securities so as to bring apparent manipulations in
shell corporation stocks to an early halt. 77 This power is particularly
74

SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8638

(July 2, 1969).
75 See, e.g., SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970);
SEC v. Les Studs Corp., CCH FED. SFC. L. REP. 1 92,866 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1970). The
Commission has observed that the shell corporation manipulation distribution pattern
"generally can only be successfully accomplished through the efforts of brokers and
dealers." SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8638 (July 2, 1969).
76 Reported in BNA SECURITIMS REGULATION & LAW REPORT, Oct. 22, 1969, at X-5.
77 The Commission's authority to suspend trading in over-the-counter securities was
added by 1964 amendments to the Exchange Act and is found in section 15(c)(5) of that
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(5) (1964). Two days after Chairman Budge's speech, the Commission
suspended trading in four companies for the period October 21-30, 1969. Three of the
companies involved had previously placed advertisements in the Wall Street Journal as
to their availability as shell corporations. BNA SECURITIES REcULATION & LAW REPORT, Oct.
22, 1969, at A-4. On December 12, 1969, the Commission announced the suspension of
seven shell firms. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8783 (Dec. 12, 1969). Such
trading suspensions have been followed in some instances with injunctive actions. See,
e.g., SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970). See also note
79 and accompanying text infra.
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effective, if employed sufficiently early, as it can prevent the usual
upward price spiral and can effectively squelch unfounded rumors.
Typically, before lifting such a suspension the Commission requires
the issuer to correct unfounded rumors. The following disclosures of
this type by an issuer are illustrative:
The following rumors concerning Santa Fe have been circulating,
none of which are true. They are absolutely false. We do not have
two former governors of Colorado on our board of directors. We
are not operating a silver mine. We are not being taken over by an
insurance company. We do not have the food and beverage concessions on the ship Queen Elizabeth. We are not contemplating
building a ski lodge near Georgetown, Colorado .... As of February 1, 1968, the company.., had current assets consisting of cash
in the sum of $7.80 .... 78

The Commission has moved on many other fronts in its war
against the shell game. It has initiated broker-dealer revocation proceedings, 7 9 sought and obtained injunctions,8 0 obtained indictments,8 1
proposed a rule and undertaken other initiatives. In one broker-dealer
revocation proceeding8 2 the Commission charged that the dealer had
engaged in a continuing pattern of market-making activities with respect to shell corporations thereby creating the appearance of a fair and
bona fide market and trading activities in such securities; that the
securities purported to represent the ownership of valuable interests in
operating business entities when, in fact, such securities did not represent such value. While this case has not been disposed of, the charges,
if sustained as a violation of the securities laws are broad enough to
make trading in most shell corporations fraudulent per se.
The shell game in its classical form, as we have noted, is designed
to result in artificially inflated stock prices fed by false rumors with the
organizers bailing out at the inflated prices. As such, it is likely to involve an unlawful manipulation, 3 fraudulent representations, 4 the
78 Sante Fe Intl, Inc., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8284 (Mar. 27, 1968).
79 See, e.g., Stone, Summers g. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8885

(May 15, 1970).

80 SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v.
Capitol Holding Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8730 (Oct. 23, 1969).
81 In October of 1970, the United States Organized Crime and Racketeering Strike
Force in New York City announced indictments in the case of United States v. Tortorello.
Indicted were eight defendants and a shell corporation for alleged violations of the
registration provisions of the Securities Act. BNA SEcuarrFs REGULATION & LAw REPORT,
Nov. 11, 1970, at A-1. See also note 62 and accompanying text supra.
82 Stone, Summers & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8885 (fay 15,
1970).
83 See note 53 and accompanying text supra.
84 See discussion at note 36 and accompanying text supra and note 118 and accompany-

ing text infra.
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distribution of securities in violation of the registration provisions,"5
86
and recommendations by brokers without an adequate basis. In fact,
the easiest charge to establish will ordinarily be a violation of the
registration provisions and hence Commission action on this basis is
most likely. Further, because of its power to administratively revoke or
otherwise impose sanctions on dealers, the Commission can be expected to utilize the failure to have a reasonable basis for a recommendation as a basis of attacking the dealer fomented and/or abetted
shell game.8 7 As we have already seen, to head it off at the outset, the
power to suspend trading can be and has been effectively utilized. Although the sine qua non of the typical shell game is to manipulate
stock prices, because of the complexity of proving a manipulation, this
is likely to be a last resort route by the Commission unless it succeeds
in establishing that trading in shell corporations is per se manipulative.
A variation of the shell game is for Company X, a relatively new
or relatively inactive company, to sell a block of its shares to Company
Y, a publicly-held company.88 Company Y then spins-off the shares
acquired in the X Company to its own shareholders as a dividend and
thus Company X now has an instant market in that dealers previously
trading in Company Y shares are likely to also make a market in Company X shares. The Commission has cautioned8 9 that, despite the notion
90
that a dividend does not ordinarily involve a sale of securities, that it
will view the transaction as a sale by the X Company to the Y Company
with Y Company being characterized as an underwriter because the

85 See SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).
88 See cases cited in note 117 infra.
87 SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970).

88 The Commission's complaint seeking an injunction in SEC v. Harwyn Indus.
Corp., filed in New York's Southern District Court on June 2, 1970. See BNA SECURrrIIS
REGULATION & LAw REPoaT, July 1, 1970, at A-3, which outlines a fairly typical spin-off
arrangement. A, the owner of all the outstanding stock of XYZ Corporation, desiring to

turn the corporation into a publicly-owned corporation, transferred all of his shares in

XYZ Corporation to Academic Development Corporation, a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Harwyn, in exchange for 800,000 shares of Academic. At the time of the transaction all
of the outstanding 1,000,000 shares of Academic were held by Harwyn; after the transaction Harwyn had 200,000 shares of Academic remaining which it distributed as a
dividend to its 500 shareholders. Thereafter a trading market developed with respect to
Academic shares. Thus A acquired an 80 percent interest in Academic; Harwyn share-

holders own 20 percent of Academic; Academic has directly or indirectly whatever assets

Harwyn may have put into it originally and the assets acquired from XYZ Corporation;
XYZ Corporation is now a wholly-owned subsidiary of Academic, and there is a trading

market in Academic stock.
89 SEC Securities Act Release No. 4982, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
8638 (July 2, 1969).
90 A stock dividend ordinarily is not a sale as that term is defined by section 2(3) of
the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1964), since it is not a disposition for value. See SEC
Securities Act Release No. 929 (July 29, 1936).
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overall transaction contemplates an ultimate unregistered distribution
to those who purchase the shares in the open market from the Y Company shareholders. The evil in the Commission's view is that a trading market has been created in the shares of the issuer "without the
disclosure required by registration." The Commission's theory brings
into play the registration provisions of the Securities Act and it has
initiated proceedings based on this theory; 91 despite reservations expressed by some, 92 precedents in analogous situations93 support the
Commission's concept of a distribution.
PRoPosED RULE 15c2-11

The Commission on June 24, 1970 proposed rule 15c2-11 which
would preclude dealers from submitting quotations to an inter-dealer
quotation system if the Security had not been regularly traded in the
over-the-counter market during the previous thirty days unless certain
specified current information is available concerning the issuer.9 4
While the scope of the rule is sufficiently broad to encompass some
companies that might not be characterized as shell companies, it is
intended primarily for the purposes of reaching trading in the securities of shells. The Commission in announcing the proposed rule stated
that some dealers have made "hasty submission of quotations in the
daily sheets . . . in the absence of any information about the security
or the issuer .... In many cases this practice has resulted in an irresponsible numbers game which, apart from having the effect of foisting unseasoned securities on the investing public, is not only disruptive
of the market but fraught with manipulative potential."0' 5 To date,
however, the Commission has not adopted the proposed rule. It is
reported that comments on the proposed rule were generally favorable
although several suggested that it was too broad and would create an
91 See SEC v. Harwyn Indus. Corp., discussed in note 89 supra, and SEC v. Les
92,866 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 1970), in which defendants
Studs Corp., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
consented to an injunction.
rPORT, Aug. 20, 1969, at B-1.
92 See Analysis, BNA SECUPrES REGULATION & LAW
93 There are a number of different context in which the Commission has held and/or
convinced the courts that a distribution is not complete until the shares reach their
ultimate purchasers and that conduits to such distribution are underwriters. Perhaps, the
most directly related is the holding of the Second Circuit that various persons in the chain
of distribution of shares of a shell corporation were underwriters as to shares ultimately
sold in the United States although funneled through Canadian conduits. SEC v. North
Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970). See also Armstrong, Jones & Co. v.
SEC 421 F.2d 359 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970); Lewisohn Copper Corp., 98
S.E.C. 226 (1958).
94 SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8909 (June 24, 1970).
95d.
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unreasonable burden on broker-dealers.9 6 The influential Investment
Bankers Association opposes the adoption of the proposed rule as
does the National Quotation Bureau (NQB). In fact, the Commission
may prefer to leave the situation vague and rely on specific actions criminal prosecutions, broker-dealer revocations, suspension of trading
and the like - and threats of such action to control the situation.
The NQB presently requires certain minimal information to be
furnished to it prior to accepting a quotation relating to an issuer for

the first time.97 It has been reported that the staff of the New York
office of the Commission has worked out a procedure with the NQB
pursuant to which a security will not be quoted initially until fortyeight hours after the staff has been furnished with the information
submitted to the NQB. 98 Presumably, the delay is to permit the staff
to make some type of investigation which conceivably might give it a
basis for suspending trading in the security. However, in view of the
limited delay ordinarily involved, it is doubtful whether such procedures will be effective except in blatant situations.
The proposed rule is designed to restrict the players by requiring
prior to quotation by a market-maker that certain minimal information
be available in the marketplace. The theory, presumably, is that the
availability of such information will discourage both market-makers
and the investing public from playing the game. Yet the information
called for, although reasonably extensive, 99 could readily be furnished
REGULATION & LAw REPORT, Nov. 11, 1970, at A-3.
96BNA SEcurri
97 The NQB requires either the submission of prospectus or completion of its form.
This form calls for inter alia, the name of the corporation, stock's par value, name of
transfer agent, available profit and loss statement and whether there is a prospectus or
offering circular available. See BNA SEcurrmas REGULATION 8c LAW REPORT, Nov. 11, 1970,
at A-2. The NASD automated quotation system is generally limited to securities registered
under the Exchange Act, which sell above $5.00 per share (but which can drop to $3.00
after authorized for quotation), as to which there are at least two market-makers placing
quotations with the system, and which meet other specified requirements. In addition,
the corporation established to manage the system can suspend authorization upon specified
grounds. CCH NASD MANuAL T 1138-1140, 1653A (1970).
98BNA ScuRrUMs REGULATION & .Dw REPORT, Nov. 11, 1970, at A-2. The staff, of
course, has procedures available to delay the quotation beyond the forty-eight hour
period by putting pressures upon the broker-dealer submitting the quotation.
99 Under proposed rule 15c2-11 as to securities not subject to quotation on a regular
basis within the previous thirty days, no dealer, subject to exceptions noted below, could
submit a quotation unless the dealer makes available to the quotation system and on
demand to anyone expressing an interest in the security the following information: name
and address of the issuer; the state of incorporation; the exact title and class of security;
the par or stated value of the security; the number of shares outstanding; information
concerning the issuer's business and management; name and address of the transfer agent;
financial statements (reasonably current); and other information. The information does
not have to be furnished as to companies subject to the reporting requirements of the
Exchange Act (either because registered under that Act or registered under the Securities
Act and having 300 or more shareholders) or as to companies which have recently (as of
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without necessarily discouraging the public from playing the so-called
numbers game. For one thing, there is no procedure for processing the
information or making it readily available to the public. The real
enforcer will remain the possibility that such information does not
furnish a suitable basis for a broker to make a recommendation 0 0 and/
or that trading in the shell corporation's securities may be held to be
per se manipulative. 101
To SHELL OR NOT To SHELL
The entire discussion of shell companies has been clouded or
enriched (depending upon one's point of view) with emotionally colored words like shell game, phony stock, phony prices, appearance of
a fair and bona fide market, representing false business values and the
like. Yet, while, as has been said of obscenity, many think they can recognize any of the foregoing categories without being able to define
them, there is a need in this area for a less emotional approach to the
problems involved. When seen in perspective the desire to use a shell
corporation variation rather than being universally motivated by quick
buck artists, may be the price some legitimate organizers are prepared
to pay in order to have a trading market in their securities. The resulting market price may give them a more realistic basis upon which to
make a subsequent public offering of their own and/or upon which to
exchange securities for properties or in other forms of acquisitions. In
economic terms the price paid may or may not be higher than if they
had taken the conventional route which, in the case of a speculative
company, is likely to involve as a minimum, cheap stock and warrants
to the underwriter or the broker-dealer prepared to make a market in
the security. The key to their willingness to pay such a price can be
found in the difficulty ordinarily encountered by new companies in
developing a trading market for their securities.
The inclination of informed counsel nonetheless, in this context,
should be to strongly urge clients, "don't do it." The reasons, in addition to the incurring of SEC disfavor, include the unnecessary dilution
involved, the difficulties encountered in finding a clean shell, and the
unnecessary costs incurred. Such costs include typically paying a findersfee, paying for an otherwise worthless control block of stock, and paying for the costs of a thorough investigation to determine the existences
of possible contingent or other liabilities.
the date of the quotation) had a registration statement in effect under the Securities Act
or a notification in effect under Regulation A.
100See cases cited in note 116 infra.
101 See note 82 and accompanying text supra.
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If the client considers the foregoing disadvantages and determines,
nonetheless, to go this route, what kind of advice should he be given?
At the outset, it seems important that all insider stock be appropriately
kept out of the market 10 2 and that trading in the shell corporation
stock not be resumed until (a) significant assets have been transferred
to the corporation and (b) sufficient public disclosures have been made.
One method of accomplishing the latter would be to voluntarily register the company under the Exchange Act. 10 3 However, in the spin-off
situation, nothing less than the 1933 Act registration will satisfy the
Commission. 10 4 In the meantime, it would be necessary to keep the rumor mill from developing and a broker-dealer from commencing trading. Both might be difficult to accomplish; however, the broker might be
threatened with the possibility of an SEC trading suspension order.
Appropriate restricted legends could be placed on insiders' stock certificates and appropriate instructions could be given to the transfer
agent. 10 5 All reports, letters, etc., distributed to shareholders and/or
dealers could be carefully policed. Communications between the issuer
and dealers (in particular, market-makers) could be monitored. Realistically, however, there are probably few clients that could be relied
upon to accept such restraints and, accordingly, many attorneys are
likely to refuse to be involved with a shell corporation.
Assuming that it were possible for the foregoing procedure to
be followed, what would the likely impact be on the marketplace? In
all probability the price of the security would go up, primarily because
the former shareholders see some possibility of salvaging their investment and because of the increased prospects of the company if it now
has properties and management of some merit. Is this per se bad? The
alternative road to the marketplace is a public offering of securities at
an arbitrarily determined price. This price will represent a combination of factors including the general state of the market for speculative
securities, the underwriter's distribution machinery, the amount of
dilution the public (or Blue-Sky commissioners)' 0 6 will tolerate and
the like. If we could assume that the marketplace has the equivalent
102 See note 105 and accompanying text infra.

103 Section 12(g)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (g)(1) (1964)
permits corporations not required to register under the criteria therein set forth to
voluntarily register any class of equity securities.
104 See note 89 and accompanying text supra.

105 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5121 (Dec. 30, 1970).

106 The federal securities laws merely require disclosure in a 1933 Act registration
statement of the extent of dilution. See Richmond Corp., SEC Securities Act Release No.
4584 (Feb. 27, 1963). For a summary of relevant Blue-Sky provisions, see Bloomenthal,
supra note 11, at 1464-66.
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information concerning the issuer in our hypothetical reformed shell
situation, it is difficult to fault the price-making mechanism in this
context. However, as is observed elsewhere, 107 there may be better alternatives if the result is, as it is likely to be, a relatively non-competitive market for the security.
THE DISCLosuRE-FRAuD APPROACH AND THE MARKETPLACE
We posit an ideal- a market price determined in a competitive
market reflecting supply and demand based on relevant and reliable
information as distinguished from a marketplace which is, in effect, a
stage managed performance. 108 What are the forces that interfere with
this ideal of a free competitive market - a list of same would include
the following: (a) An information vacuum - that is, an absence of
relevant information concerning the issuer; a vacuum often filled by
unsubstantiated rumors; (b) Dissemination of false or misleading information; (c) The withholding of material information (favorable or
adverse) that is reasonably certain to affect the market price; 10 (d) The
structure of the over-the-counter market in the particular security in
terms of the number of dealers making the market and the resources
(and interest) of the market-maker; (e) The reliability of the quotations and the quotations system; (f) Market activities of the old-style
manipulator- actual purchases and sham transactions designed to
create an appearance of activity and to raise the market price; (g) The
"merchandising" activities of the retailer.
The first attack on the information vacuum is, of course, the
registration requirements of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act
and the supplemental reporting requirements. 110 In theory, for such
registered securities there is a bank of information available; some of
the principal problems here involve retrieving the information. However, in the case of shell companies such information may not be
available. This, as we have seen, is one of the Commission's basic
107 See discussion commencing at note 166 and accompanying text infra.
108 See Halsey, Stuart & Co., 30 S.E.C. 106, 112 (1949).
109 The language "reasonably certain to affect the market price" is used advisedly.

See discussion at note 121 and accompanying text infra.
110 Securities Act registration requires the filing of a registration statement and the
delivery of a prospectus and is applicable generally to public offerings of securities by
the issuer or persons controlling the issuer. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1964). Exchange Act registration requires the filing of information comparable to that required of companies subject
to Securities Act registration and is applicable generally to issuers which have $I,000,000
or more in total assets and a class of equity securities as to which there are 500 or more
shareholders of record. 15 U.S.C. § 781(g) (1964). Companies registered under the
Exchange Act must file periodic reports to keep the information current, id. § 78m, and
companies registered under the Securities Act must file similar reports if they have 300
or more shareholders, id. § 78o(d).
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objections to the utilization of shell companies. In the spin-off variation, the Commission has spun a theory that will require registration
under the Securities Act prior to extensive trading in the security."'
As to other corporate shell situations, insiders often will be selling
their personally owned shares in violation of the registration provisions
which does not assure the filing of a registration statement but facilitates SEC injunctions" 2 and broker-dealer revocation proceedings'" if
a securities dealer is involved.
In the event the vacuum is filled by the rumor mill, there are
a number of weapons available. The Commission can and has temporarily (and through a series of such orders over an extended period)" 4
suspended trading in the security. A condition for lifting such suspension order is usually the requirement that the issuer release and
widely distribute a statement refuting the rumors and setting the
record straight. Further, an issuer may even incur a liability for failure
to correct rumors of which it is aware. 115 Finally, the Commission has
a most effective weapon directed at broker-dealers -revocation proceedings based upon the making of recommendations without an adequate basis for such recommendation. Since many of the activities involved almost necessarily require the participation of a securities
dealer, effective policing in this area is an imperative. The Second Circuit has defined the standard - a securities dealer has a special relationship to a buyer of securities and implicitly represents he has an adequate basis for the opinions he renders. The dealer has a duty to
avoid the use of unconfirmed rumors and reports as a basis for recommending stock to purchasers. 116
The dissemination of false or misleading information by securities dealers, issuers and others is also subject to effective policing by
the Commission. The information may have been disseminated in the
111 See note 89 and accompanying text supra.
112 SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev. Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v.
Mono-Kearsage Consol. Mining Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
90,894. (D. Utah Oct. 8, 1958).
113 See SEC Securities Act Release No. 4445, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No.
6721 (Feb. 2, 1962). Compare Quinn & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9062
(Jan. 25, 1971).
114 See note 78 supra. For an instance in which the order suspending trading in stock
of a shell corporation remained in effect for in excess of nine months and was not lifted
until after an injunction against further violations was obtained, see Capitol Holding
Corp., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8730 (Oct. 23, 1969).
115 Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). See also as to securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange,
Guidelines for Timely and Adequate Disclosure of Corporate News, NEw YORK STOCx
EXCHANGE COMPANY MANUAL A-23 (1968).
l1 Hiller v. SEC, 429 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1970); SEC v. North Am. Research & Dev.
Corp., 424 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1970); Hanly v. SEC 415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1969).
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form of progress reports, shareholder letters, news releases and the like
issued by the company or research reports issued by broker-dealers
and/or investment advisers. With respect to broker-dealers and investment advisers the Commission can utilize its power of revocation; 11
with respect to issuers the Commission can seek to enjoin the use of
the information even when only negligently (as distinguished from intentionally) misrepresented."18 The fraud and manipulation provisions
are so intertwined that they cannot be placed in separate categories false or misleading statements may not be part of a scheme to affect
market prices; this is a reasonable assumption if negligently made. On
the other hand, if intentionally made the reasonable assumption is
a scheme to affect market price. Insofar as an SEC obtained injunction
is concerned, scienter in this context is immaterial; with respect to
private actions it may be relevant. ll The Commission in this area can
also, of course, use its power to suspend trading in the security.
The withholding of material information suggests, of course, the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case and is a subject so widely discussed 20 in the
literature we make only brief reference to it here. While treated generally as a fraud problem, again it cannot be entirely separated from
market manipulations. In fact, the test of materiality generally suggested in this area recognizes that what we are concerned with here is
the withholding of information that is reasonably certain to affect the
market price of the security (up or down).12 ' We know that the Com117 Section 15(b)(5) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1964), authorizes the

revocation of registration of broker-dealers for violations of the Securities Act or Exchange
Act, and section 203(d)(D) of the Investment Advisers Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(d)(D) (1964),
authorizes revocation of registration of an investment adviser on similar grounds. See
Levine v. S.E.C., 436 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1971); Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961), for
cases involving broker-dealer revocation. For an investment adviser revocation proceeding
see Roman S. Gorski, SEC Investment Advisers Act Release No. 214 (Dec. 22, 1967).
118 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). On remand the district court concluded that the press release was misleading and that the company officials had failed to exercise due diligence in its
preparation but declined to issue an injunction on the grounds that in view of the
passage of time and other factors further violations were not likely. S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
119 See discussion commencing at note 152 and accompanying text infra.
120 See, e.g., Bromberg, Corporate Information: Texas Gulf Sulphur and Its Implications, 22 Sw. LJ. 731 (1968); Navin, Insider's Liability Under Rule 10b-5 for the Illegal
Purchase of Actively Traded Securities, 78 YALE L.J. 864 (1969); Ruder, Texas Gulf
Sulphur- The Second Round: Privity and State of Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchase and

Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. Rv. 423 (1968).
121 The majority opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur defined materiality both in terms of
events which are "extraordinary in nature" and "reasonably certain" to affect market
prices, 401 F.2d at 848, and facts which "might affect" market price. Id. at 849. Further,
in the same opinion the court talked about materiality in terms of facts which "may
affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold the company's securities ..
" Id. While
the latter two statements of materiality may require greater disclosure, it seems to the
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mission can act by seeking an injunction and to the extent a brokerdealer is involved through broker-dealer revocation proceedings provided insiders are contemporaneously purchasing or selling their own
securities. 1 2 The extent that an issuer has an affirmative obligation to

disclose such information absent insider trading has not been determined. The Commission's reporting requirements are neither timely
23
enough nor extensive enough to effectively require such disclosures.1
Companies with securities listed on the New York and American Stock
Exchanges as part of their listing agreement or otherwise commit themselves to generally make such timely disclosure. 1 24 There may yet be determined under existing statutory provisions and appropriate rules an
affirmative duty to make such disclosure, at least if it can be established
that the information has been withheld because of its likely impact
on the market price of the security. 25 It is difficult to understand why
the Commission has not acted in this area by the adoption of an appropriate rule and it may yet do so.126
author and to others (including Phillip A. Loomis, the Commission's General Counsel)
that in this context all that should be expected is disclosure of information reasonably
certain to have an immediate and substantial effect on market price. For the Loomis
77,624 (1968). See also
remarks, see [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corporate Information Practices: The Implications of
the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding,51 VA. L. REv. 1271, 1289 (1965).
122 S.E.C. v. Great Am. Indus. Inc., 407 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 U.S.
920 (1969); S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969).
123 Form 8-K which is the appropriate form for filing current developments by
companies subject to the reporting requirements, see note 111 supra, does not have to
be filed until ten days after the month in which the event occurs. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13a-ll
(1970). Further, it does not call for disclosure of the type of information involved in the
Texas Gulf Sulphur case although the reporting company may at its option include events
which have occurred during the past month "which the registrant deems of material
importance to security holders." Form 8-K, item 12.
124 See Nmv YORK STOcK EXCHANGE COMPANY MANuAL A-18 through A-27 (1968); CCH

COMPANY GumE §§ 401-406 (1970).
125 In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the court indicated that the timing of disclosure is a
matter for business judgment at least if the withholding of information serves a corporate
purpose. 401 F.2d 883 n.12. However, a district court has regarded as actionable and
appropriate for submission to a jury the withholding of information by insiders in the
event such information has been withheld as part of a scheme to artificially maintain
the market price of a security. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp.,
92,760 (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 1970). See
[1969-1970 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEC. L. REP.
also Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), in which the
court refused to dismiss on motion for summary judgment the claim of plaintiffs based on
defendant corporation's failure to disclose material information during the period subsequent to the date upon which no corporate purpose was apparently served by further
withholding the information and dismissing claims based on transactions prior to such
date.
126 The Commission on October 15, 1970 reiterated its view as to "the need for
publicly held companies to make prompt and accurate disclosure of information, both
favorable and unfavorable, to security holders and the investing public. . . ." However,
while pointing out that failure to make such disclosures may constitute a violation if the
Axm.

1971]

MARKET-MAKERS

The structural market problem involves primarily the so-called
controlled and dominated market. Any market, in which there is
essentially only one dealer making the market, is potentially a candidate for a broker-dealer revocation proceeding, as the proof in this
type of case typically consists of a statistical analysis showing participation by that dealer in a large percentage of all trading transactions
pertaining to the security over a given period of time. The thin line
between permitted and illegal markets in this area is,
to say the least,
a gray one. To the extent the problem relates to the precarious situation created for investors in the event the only market-maker withdraws from the market, disclosure of this fact may be helpful. However,
to the extent such markets fail to achieve the posited ideal there appears to be no consensus as to a viable alternative. The problem is one
aspect of the larger problems relating to access by unseasoned companies to the marketplace. Yet, as the Special Study seemed to accept,' 27
such a market may well be better than no market at all if not accompanied by some of the other market distorters discussed herein. Some
128
of the alternatives are discussed below.
Closely related to the problem of the controlled and dominated
market is the reliability of the quotation system. In terms of making
information available concerning quotations, the automatic quotation
system initiated by the NASD is a welcome and significant advancement. However, some of the basic problems will remain and require
policing. These include fictitious quotations; inducing others to furnish quotations which in effect are backed by a single market-maker,
lack of reliability as to the quotations in terms of number of shares the
dealer is prepared to purchase and the like. The fictitious quotation
and furnishing quotations for others are subject to regulation and
policing, but there are no established rules as to the extent to which a
dealer has to be prepared to purchase or sell securities at the quoted
price. 129 In addition, the existing quotation systems are in private
corporation is purchasing its own securities or insiders are trading in its securities and
that the rules and directives of the major exchanges require such disclosures, the
Commission persists in refraining from adopting a rule that would spell out such
requirements generally and specify the circumstances requiring and the timing of such
disclosures. See SEC Securities Act Release No. 5092, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8995, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 6209 (Oct. 15, 1970).
127 SEC SpEcIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 2, at 661-62, 673. The Special Study did recommend
that "[a] broker-dealer soliciting a customer's purchase of any security for which there is
no independent market other than its own, or any security out of its own inventory, or
any security in which there is a spread of, say, 20% or more in prevailing inter-dealer
bids and offers, should be required to disclose such fact or facts at the time of solicitation ... " Id. at 673.
128 See 636 et seq. infra.
129 See rule 15c2-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-7 (1970); Rules of Fair Practiceof the NASD,
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hands and the extent to which entry into the system is regulated is
informal and inadequate. The Commission has acted timidly in this
area; the only attempt to regulate such entry by rule has yet to be
adopted and faces powerful opposition. 13 0 Such inadequacies encourage and facilitate over-the-counter market manipulations.
The framers of the Exchange Act thought of manipulation largely
in terms of effectuating a series of transactions at rising prices, thereby
creating an appearance of activity designed to induce others to enter
the marketplace adding to the pressure for higher prices. The Commission has adequate authority in this area both with respect to overthe-counter and listed securities which permit revocation of brokerdealer registration and injunctive action against other manipulators.
The problem in this context is the extensive surveillance and investigation that have to be employed to police this type of activity and difficulties encountered in proving wrongful conduct involving questions
of motivation. However, in the latter regard in the broker-dealer
revocation area, as we have previously seen, 131 the Commission has
gone a long way in drawing the inferences necessary to support a violation.
"Merchandising" of securities overlaps with a number of the foregoing. Obviously, to the extent false or misleading representations, the
withholding of inside information, recommendations without an adequate basis, violations of the registration provisions, or controlled or
dominated markets or the like are involved the factors discussed above
are pertinent. Since "merchandising" is often accompanied by such
activities, it is somewhat artificial to attempt to isolate it as a separate
basis for violation. However, the inherent conflict of interest involved
has at long last been recognized to a degree in the Chasins case requiring, if the dealer knows the customer is relying on its recommendation,
disclosure of the fact that the dealer acting as principal and recommending the security for purchase is also making a market in the
security. As suggested below, however, one may question whether disclosure is adequate to deal with the problems raised in this context.
PRIVAxE ACTIONS
The experience under section 16(b), which is enforceable only

through private actions, demonstrates the efficacy of such actions in
art. III, § 5, CCH NASD MANuAL '12155 (1970). See also NASD Board of Governors Policy
with Respect to Firmness of Quotations, id. at
2156; Franklin Natl Bank v. L.B.
Meadows & Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1 92,940. (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1970).
130 Proposed rule 15c2-11, see discussion commencing at note 95 and accompanying
text supra.
131 See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
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promoting compliance with the federal securities laws. 132 Accordingly,
private actions for damages and/or injunctive relief for unlawful activities that affect the market price of securities, may constitute a
significant policing factor and deterrent. If the private party has purchased securities from his broker-dealer and the broker-dealer is a
participant in such activities, the private party is likely to have a
remedy. In fact, the name of the game often is when to sue one's
dealer 33 since they are generally liable in private actions for violation
of the federal securities laws'13 (and related regulations) and in some
instances for violations of the rules of the exchange of which they are
a member and/or of the NASD. 35 The effectiveness of private actions
in this area depends upon the ability to prove the violation and the
financial solvency of the dealer. 36
If the broker-dealer had engaged in a series of transactions designed to affect the market price of the security, liability with respect to
listed securities is expressly provided for under the Exchange Act to
all persons who purchased the security at a price affected by these activities and who has been damaged.137 The scope of a section 10(b)
action is undoubtedly as great with respect to a similar situation involving an unlisted security.13 Similarly, there is little question as to a
broker-dealer's liability to a customer for securities purchased (or sold)
which are misrepresented or recommended without an adequate basis.
If a broker-dealer withholds information and is an insider as that term
has been broadly-defined, he undoubtedly has liability to someone
132 Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1964), authorizes in a
private action recovery on behalf of the corporation of short-swing profits realized by
insiders; it does not make such transactions unlawful.
133 A consumer's newsletter in a recent article, citing chapter and verse (including the
Chasins case), refers readers to several securities lawyers in a number of metropolitan
areas. How Dishonest Is Your Stockbroker?, MONEYSWORTH, Feb. 8, 1971, at 1.
'34 Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REI,.
92,962 (2d Cir.

far. 2,

1971). The cases are numerous and many of them are collected and cited in Franklin
Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co., CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.
92,940 (S.D.N.Y. June 25,
1970).
'35 Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 8. Smith, Inc., 410 F2d 135 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969). Compare Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 858 F.2d
178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966).
136 The Securities Investor Protection Corporation Act of 1970, see note 10 supra,
probably does not afford additional direct protection since it is designed to protect accounts of customers and a claim for damages is not an account. However, reserve and
other requirements of the Act conceivably could generally contribute to the financial
solvency of dealers.
137 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964).
138 Klein v. Auchincloss, 436 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1971); Davis v. Pennzoil Corp., 438 Pa.
194, 264 A.2d 597 (1970). Compare Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L. B. Mfeadows & Co., CCH
FE . SEC. L. REP.
92,940 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1970), holding a broker-dealer liable for
violations of rule 15c2-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-7 (1970), pertaining to fictitious quotations
even in the absence of privity. See also notes 60, 129 and accompanying text supra.
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while trading in the security 39 although as in the case of other insiders
to whom and to what extent remains to be determined. 40 If the brokerdealer has such information available and withholds it but refrains
from trading, he may, nonetheless, be liable to those that purchase

(or sell, as the case may be) when such information is withheld in order
to affect the market price.' 4 '

In the area of "merchandising" of securities, a broker-dealer who
recommends the security without an adequate basis is liable to the
customers purchasing the security from him. 42 The broker-dealer
may be liable if he fails to disclose that he has a material position in
the security being recommended, 43 or if he knows that the client is
relying on his recommendation that he is making a market in the
security, 1 44 or that he is the only market-maker with respect to the
security, 45 or that he has a controlling interest in the issuer. 46 We

have probably seen only the beginning of private litigation in these
areas.
In the broker-dealer area many of the situations referred to above
involve privity - that is, the plaintiff will have purchased from or sold
the security to the defendant broker-dealer. With respect to private actions brought against the issuer or persons associated with the issuer,
privity in this context is likely to be absent. As to the traditional type
of manipulation involving a series of transactions designed to raise (or
lower) the market price of a listed security, section 9(e) of the Exchange
Act expressly imposes liability on the manipulator irrespective of
privity.147 Similarly, as suggested above, liability can be imposed under
139 Rule lOb-5 upon which liability is predicated is applicable to "any person" and
a broker-dealer may be a corporate insider. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
While Cady, Roberts doesn't determine the question of a broker-dealer's liability, there
is no basis to expect that broker-dealers can escape liability in view of the fact that it
is imposed on other insiders, see note 149 infra, and in view of the general predilection of
courts to impose liability on broker-dealers, see note 133 supra.
340 See discussion commencing at note 149 and accompanying text infra.
141 A jury has awarded damages to a plaintiff in the amount of $712,500 against an
issuer and a broker-dealer who allegedly withheld unfavorable information from the
marketplace in order to maintain the price of the security at an artificial level. The
security was purchased in the open market and there was no privity between the plaintiff
and defendants. See Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell-Douglas Corp., CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP.
92,760 & 92,811 (D. Colo. Aug. 13, 1970 & Sept. 20, 1970).
142 See cases cited in note 117 supra.
143 But see SEC v. R.A. Holman & Co. 366 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1966), and Judge
Friendly's opinion in Chasins, CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,962 at 90,560.
144 See discussion of the Chasins case commencing at 610 supra.
145 Id.
146 See rule 15cl-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-5 (1970), which requires such disclosures.
147 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1964). Compare Franklin Nat'l Bank v. L.B. Meadows & Co.,
CCH FE. S c. L. REaP.
92,940 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1970), holding that an implied cause of
action may be brought by one damaged by fictitious quotations placed in violation of
rule 15c2-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-7 (1970), even in the absence of privity.
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section 10(b) as to unlisted securities and with respect to listed securities when the short statute of limitations provided for by the Exchange
Act has run. 4 8 There have not been a significant number of private actions relating to activities of this type undoubtedly because such activities are difficult to prove.
With respect to the failure to disclose material current developments reasonably certain to affect the market price of the security, the
law is currently developing and can be capsuled only at considerable
risk of being modified tomorrow. Insiders who trade on the basis of
such undisclosed information are clearly liable, but the extent to which
and to whom remains to be determined. 149 The corporation probably
does not have any liability for the failure to disclose such information
provided there is an appropriate corporate reason for withholding such
information. 5 0 Absent such appropriate reason and/or if the information is being deliberately withheld because of its probable impact on
the market price, the corporation may very well be liable to those purchasing or selling the security during the relevant period. 51
In the area of manipulation through "touting"- that is, the
spreading of false or misleading information, the law also is not fully
developed. Here we meet two- consistent in theory but not in application- policy considerations. First, the desire to encourage issuers
and other concerned persons to widely disseminate corporation information; second, the avoidance of false or misleading information designed to run up (or down) the price of the stock. Accordingly, if the
issuer or those associated with it are disseminating information which
is relied upon by those purchasing in the market, it is likely that absent
privity (the usual situation in this context) that liability will be im148 Klein v. Auchincloss, 486 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1971).
149
In the original Texas Gulf Sulphur proceeding the Commission requested that insiders who purchased TGS stock in violation of rule lOb-5 be required to make restitution to the persons who sold to them. However, when relief was finally granted, the court
approved the Commission's suggestion that individual defendants be required to pay

in the amount of their (and also their tippees) profits to the corporation. The amounts
paid in are to be held in escrow by the corporation in an interest-bearing account for a

period of three years subject to disposition as directed by the court upon application of
the SEC or other interested person or on the court's own motion. See S.E.C. v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 312 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See also Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 806 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Compare Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,
248 N.E.2d 210, 201 N.Y.S.2d 78 (1969), in which recovery by the Corporation was allowed for profits realized by insiders on the basis of trading on inside information as a
common-law derivative action.
150 See note 125 supra.

151 See notes 125 and 141 supra. Failure of the issuer to report to appropriate regulatory authorities activities of a broker-dealer which it knew had the effect of artificially
increasing the price of the issuer's stock has been held in the particular circumstances of
the case to constitute aiding and abetting a violation of rule lOb-5. Brennan v. Midwestern
United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970).
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posed only if (a) plaintiff relied on the false or misleading information,
(b) defendants could have foreseen such reliance and (c) some form of
scienter is present. 52 The real debate in this area will probably be over
the type of scienter required - mere knowledge as distinguished from
wrongful motive. 153 The author would suggest that in this context
knowledge of the relevant facts should not be enough; the knowledge
required in this context should be that the information as presented
is misleading. Knowledge that it is misleading suggests motive (that
is intent to deceive) and motive suggests knowledge that the material
is misleading.154 In any event, such conclusions are likely to be based
on inference which is not inappropriate. However, those who have
responsibility for the preparation and dissemination of corporate information should not face unlimited liability for essentially innocent
or at its worse negligent conduct in preparing information which in
retrospect is judged to be misleading.
There are a number of persons who are adversely affected economically in fact by manipulative activities, but who may have no
cause of action because they have neither purchased nor sold the
security in question as a result of the manipulative activities. The
courts in several different contexts have been struggling with the
Birnbaum proposition that section 10(b) of the Exchange Act protects
only defrauded purchasers or sellers of securities. 155 The doctrine is
said to be much weakened generally, 156 but yet it lives on in many
areas. 157 One thing appears reasonably clear and that is shareholders
152 Heit v. Weitzen, 402 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 903 (1969); Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 809 F. Supp. 566 (D. Utah 1970); Astor v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. 1333 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
153 See discussion of this issue in Astor v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 306 F. Supp. at
1343-44. See also Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,944
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 1971).
154 In the author's view, the issue in this context differs from (and hence shouldn't
be controlled by) those cases which disagree on whether scienter is necessary in an action
based on rule lOb-5 in order to reconcile allowing actions under this provision which
would otherwise duplicate express causes of action under sections 11 and 12(2) of the
Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 771(2) (1964). Compare Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co.,
188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951) (requiring scienter), with Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th
Cir. 1961) (dispensing with a scienter requirement in that context). The author finds
the view expressed by Judge Friendly, concurring in Texas Gull Sulphur, as persuasive
on this point. 401 F.2d at 866-67. The following type of finding would appear both
appropriate and essential: "[T]he press release issued by defendants was misleading, intentionally deceptive, inaccurate and knowingly deficient in material facts pertaining to
the results of drilling ...." Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 309 F. Supp. at 562.
155 Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461, 464 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343
U.S. 956 (1952).
156 See Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970).
157 See Greenstein v. Paul, 400 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1968), holding that a shareholder has
no action for alleged siphoning of corporate assets by defendants in order to depress
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who neither sell nor purchase may bring a private injunctive action
to enjoin manipulative activities that are continuing and adversely
affect them. Thus, they may enjoin a continuing unlawful scheme to
depress the market price of their shares, but absent some special circumstances probably cannot recover damages. 0 8 The Commission is
attempting as amicus curiae to convince the courts that Birnbaum
should be overruled in this respect and that a plaintiff's right to bring
an action should be based upon (1) whether plaintiff has been harmed
and (2) whether the harm was caused by an actionable wrong on the
part of the defendant rather than the artificial criterion of whether the
plaintiff is a purchaser or seller of securities. 59 The logic of the Commission's position appears to be persuasive and, if adopted, should
eliminate in the context of private actions involving alleged manipulative activities much of the hasseling and maneuvering that now goes
on in terms of whether the plaintiff as a non-seller or non-purchaser
has standing. 6 0
In the particular area of shell corporations and spin-offs, private
actions are available to the extent there has been a violation of the
registration provisions of the Securities Act.' 6 If, as is often the case,
manipulative market practices are involved, the remedies discussed
above are available, but as there noted, the type of investigation required
market price, and Iroquois Indus., Inc. v. Syracuse China Corp., 417 F.2d 963 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 909 (1970), holding plaintiff has no action against defendant
who allegedly frustrated plaintiff's tender offer through false representations that induced
shareholders not to accept the tender offer. But compare cases in note 158 infra: Cochran
v. Channing Corp., 211 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
158 Mutual Shares Corp. v. Genesco, 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967), where a non-selling
shareholder was denied damages, but granted injunctive relief. See also Puharich v.
Borders Elec., [196 7-19 69 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 92,141 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
24, 1968), which allowed injunctive relief under similar circumstances. Compare Crane
Co., v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822
(1970), which allowed plaintiff to recover damages although neither a purchaser nor seller
for defendant's manipulation designed to raise the market price of the security in question
for the purpose of frustrating plaintiff's tender offer, the court stating that the manipulation had caused injury to plaintiff and remanding to the district court to determine the
extent of the damage. Id. at 797. However, the case can be reconciled with the purchaser
or seller requirement in that the court concluded that because of the requirements of
the antitrust laws the plaintiff was required to divest itself of the shares acquired as a
result of its generally unsuccessful tender offer and hence was a forced seller.
159 See Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae, Levine v. Seilon, Inc., 436 F.2d 88 (2d Cir.
1971); BNA SECURiTims REGULATION & LAw ,REPORT, Jan. 20, 1971, at E-1.
160 The cases cited in notes 157 and 158 supra, are only illustrative of the litigation
dealing with the preliminary question of whether the plaintiff has an appropriate interest
to maintain the action. See Ernst & Ernst v. United States Southern District Court of
Texas, CCH FED. Sac. L. REP.
92,953 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 1971), for the type of maneuvering
involved. For a discussion of a similar question in the related context of derivative actions
which now appears to be finally resolved, see Bloomenthal, From Birnbaum to Schoenbaum: The Exchange Act and Self-Aggrandizement, 15 N.Y.L.F. 332 (1969).
161 Securities Act of 1933 § 12(1), 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1964).
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may be too extensive to make proof feasible. It is unlikely, however,
that a market manipulation is not being accompanied by the dissemination of false or misleading information and the entire arsenal of private
remedies against the broker-dealer, issuer and associated person are
available in this situation. The principal limitation, however, may
very well be that by the time the investors realize that they have been
duped there is no financially responsible defendant available to sue.
The foregoing actions often can be facilitated by the bringing of
a class action. The subject of class actions is beyond the scope of this
article; suffice it to say that the liberal application of the revised federal rule pertaining to class actions has tremendous promise and significance in terms of making more effective enforcement and compliance with federal securities laws generally and those pertaining to
fraud and manipulation in particular. 162
BEYOND DISCLOSURE-FRAUD

The "merchandising" of securities in secondary markets presents
problems which, despite the formidable and numerous theories requiring disclosure and/or upon which liability may be imposed at
the instance of both private and public enforcers, do not lend themselves to effective control through the disclosure-fraud apparatus. In the
author's judgment the overall impact of the disclosure-fraud approach
will remain peripheral and uneven, in part because it fails to come
to grips with the real problems and in part because disclosure is not
likely to be effective.
What type of disclosure is likely to be required and at what point
must it be made? Obviously, if it is to be effective it must be prior to
the completion of the transaction. To the extent the recommendations
involved are written the disclosure will probably consist of statements
to the effect that the broker-dealer from time to time maintains a position in the security (long or short) and makes a market in the security.
If the broker-dealer is the only market-maker, this fact would also have
to be disclosed and in those instances in which the broker-dealer controls the issuer this fact must also be disclosed. 63 Conceivably when all
four disclosures are required the cumulative effect might in itself deter investors; generally, however, the average speculative investor is
not going to be deterred by the disclosure that his broker-dealer main162 See Dolgow v. Anderson, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1970), modified, id. at 833 (2d
Cir. 1971), for an illustration of the possibilities in this regard. See also Bernfeld,
Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 CORNELL L. Ray. 78 (1969).
163 See discussion commencing at 629 supra. As to disclosure of the broker-dealer's
control of the issuer, see rule 15cl-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15cl-5 (1970).
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tains a position in the security and makes the market in the security.'"
In fact, if he is sophisticated enough to conclude that his broker-dealer
is really pushing the particular security he may be encouraged to buy
it in the expectation that the broker's activities are going to carry
the price to a higher level. 165
If the reGommendation is made over the telephone, the disclosure
will be made too late to be effective. This will be true in many instances even though from a legal standpoint the transaction is not
completed until some period of time after the disclosure. In Chasins, the
court declined to address itself to the question of the best mechanics
for disclosure. However, to the extent disclosure is required, the disclosure undoubtedly has to be prior to the completion of the transaction.166 One method of doing this would be to allow the purchaser a
period of time (perhaps twenty-four hours) after receipt of the confirmation accompanied by the disclosure in which to renounce or
reaffirm the transaction. Disclosure in concrete specific terms directed
to a particular security and spelling out some of its implications is
likely to be more effective than one cast in general terms. 16 7 Further,
164 Interestingly enough, the manager of the trading department of Smith, Barney &
Co. testified in the Chasins case that "[flrom the point of view of the knowledgeable investor, disclosure to him that he would be purchasing from a market-maker would only
have encouraged him in his decision to buy." CCH FED. SEC. L. REs. $ 92,962, at 90,561.
165 Which probably accounts for the fact that as to listed securities section 9(a)(3)
of the Exchange Act expressly makes it unlawful to induce the purchase or sale of a
security by representing that one's market operations will result in the price of a security
rising or falling. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(3) (1964).
166 This is the requirement in the comparable situation with respect to disclosure
of the broker-dealer's control of the issuer which must be disclosed before entering into
a contract with the customer. Rule 15cl-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c1-5 (1970). Interestingly,
the Special Study thought of reaching the "merchandising" problem described in this
article primarily in terms of requiring in market letters, progress reports and the like,
disclosure of the fact that the recommending dealer has a position in the security and
makes a market in the security. SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 1, at 385-86. Both the New
York Stock Exchange and the NASD have adopted requirements applicable to their respective members designed to implement this recommendation. 2 CCH N.Y. STocK ExcH. GUIDE
2474 A. 10 (1970); CCH NASD MANUAL
2017-2020, 2151.01 (1970). In most instances
the disclosures are on the bottom of a report containing several recommendations and
are made in such general terms that they probably are not very effective. In fact, in the
Chasins case, the plaintiff as to one of the securities involved had received a research report which included the following typical legend: "We point out that in the course of
our regular business we may be long or short of any of the above securities at any time."
CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,962, at 90,561.
167 A disclosure that might be meaningful would be the following:
We call your attention to the fact that we are the princlpal market-maker in the
common stock of XYZ Corporation. In the event, we should discontinue making
a market in this security it may not be possible for you to sell it in normal brokerage channels and the market price of the security might be seriously affected.
As a market-maker we have a potential conflict of interest with customers to

whom we recommend the security as at any given time depending upon our position in the security it may be to our interest to recommend to you the purchase
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requiring the transaction to be reaffirmed rather than renounced may
have a different practical impact. None of these matters are likely to
be specifically spelled out by way of judicial decision although they
do lend themselves to the Commission's rule-making powers and apparently are being currently considered by the Commission. 68
There will be no effective regulation of "merchandising" until
some basic structural changes occur in the over-the-counter market.
The lesser of these changes is to preclude a dealer making a market
in a security from executing orders for his customers except as agent
for his customer and through some other dealer's market. However,
with reciprocity being what it is in the securities industry this is not
likely to be wholly effective. 6 9 The more drastic and more realistic
change would be to require the separation of the wholesaler and retailer function at least as to the same security. The result would be to
preclude a dealer, making a market in a security, from also recommending the security to its customer. While the author is not naive enough
to believe that wholesale dealers wouldn't still attempt to influence retailers in their recommendations, 170 other steps could then be taken
to reach various forms of inducements that wholesalers might hold out
to retailers and their sales forces.
The real problems, however, in this area involve the dealer's inherent conflict of interest and the impact of "merchandising" on
securities prices. Chasins is the first judicial recognition of the former
problem, the court stating bluntly that the evil involved "is that recommendations to clients will be based upon the best interests of the dealer
or sale of the security. Accordingly, our recommendations of this security should
not be regarded as a disinterested one.
168 Section 15(c)(i) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78o(c)(l) (1964), expressly authorizes
the Commission to define by rules and regulations practices which if engaged in by a
broker-dealer shall be deemed to be manipulative, deceptive or otherwise fraudulent.
169 The interpositioning cases are a good illustration of how dealers are prone to
use give-ups and other reciprocity arrangements to compensate one another indirectly
for what they cannot do directly and often at the customer's expense. See, e.g., Thompson
& McKinnon, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8310 (May 8, 1968). It is, of course,
possible to engage in a manipulation and execute transactions on an agency basis. See
cases cited in note 53 supra, all of which involve manipulation of listed securities; for an
over-the-counter agency manipulation, see S.T. Jackson & Co., 36 S.E.C. 631 (1950).
170 As in interpositioning, the compensation might consist in some manner in making reciprocal business available. Nor, of course, would the proposal eliminate the incentive of the wholesaler to manipulate the market price of the security. Thus, in Stone,
Summers & Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8885 (May 15, 1970), the brokerdealer charged with manipulating the market price of shares of several corporate shells
publicly defended its activities by claiming that all of its sales were made to professional
brokers only. See CCH FED. SEc. L. REs'. News Letter, May 20, 1970, at 2-3. To the extent
wholesale dealers attempt to induce others to recommend the stock in return for some
form of undisclosed compensation, such activities could probably be reached by the antifraud provisions. See SEC v. Torr, 15 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1936).
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rather than the client. . . ."171 The Special Study recognized the latter
problem in the context of the dominated market as one in which prices
"may be affected by the firm's own activity at the retail level."' 72 A
prophylactic approach -that
is, one designed to prevent the conflict
of interest and the interference with market prices - is essential.
One might ask what distinguishes this type of "merchandising"
from the sale of securities generally which after all in any event involves
selling effort by retail dealers and their registered representatives, It
needs to be acknowledged that all selling effort based upon earning
commissions includes its own inducement to engage in fraudulent or
puffing statements. However, the dangers are especially acute in the
case of a "merchandised" security not only because of the special
rewards available but also because the salesman no longer is performing his function of assisting the client in making a choice among competing choices. In the typical trading transaction the salesman may be
interested in inducing the client to make a purchase in order to earn
a commission, but he is quite indifferent to the security being purchased and hence can to that extent be objective about its selection.
In fact, his own self-interest in this context dictates as wise a selection
as possible; a satisfied customer will come back whereas a dissatisfied
one may turn out to be the plaintiff in a forthcoming lawsuit against
the salesman and the firm. In the case of a "merchandised" security
the firm's and the salesman's own conflict of interest often precludes the
integrated firm from making a disinterested recommendation.
The existence of "merchandising" in the secondary market undoubtedly contributes to the type of speculative frenzy that results
in accentuating swings in stock price levels. The Commission's approach to the problem has been piecemeal and largely ineffective. In
fact, the Commission contributes to these accentuated fluctuations because its policy of emphasizing the negative discourages stock purchases
in speculative enterprises at opportune times, whereas it arrives on
the scene too late and with ineffective weapons to curb a speculative
frenzy once it is underway.17 3 At best the Commission's efforts reach
only the periphery of the problem.
171 CCH Fmn. SEc. L. REP.

92,962, at 90,559.

pt. 2, at 588.
Since this is a law review article, presumably, footnotes are required. However,
one cannot readily cite authoritative sources for what essentially is an assertion based on
approximately twenty years of observation. Some of the limitations on the Commission's
ability to deal with speculative markets is reflected in the Special Study Report. SEC
SPEciAL STUDY REPORT, pt. 1, at 261-90. The author suggests that the yet to be written
history of the financing of exploration for uranium in the United States would provide
some appropriate documentation. In the early 1950's, the Commission's staff discouraged
172 SEC SPECIAL STUDY REPORT,

173
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The proposal to separate the wholesale and retail phase of the
securities business is not, of course, a new one. 174 If its sweep proves to
be too broad in the sense that it encompasses operations that do not
pose the evil raised, exclusions from its sweep under appropriate safeguards can be provided for. One possibility in this respect could be to
exclude broker-dealers who give adequate assurance that their trading
175
departments are completely insulated from their retail departments.
Special consideration in this context must be given to the appropriate
role of the broker-dealer's research department. Such departments can
be and have been utilized as an adjunct to the type of merchandising
activities condoned in this article; on the other hand the disinterested
advice of such a department may be essential if registered representatives
are to make informed recommendations to customers. Further, it
would be inappropriate to deny a dealer the benefit of the research
group's knowledge in determining whether to make a market in a
security in the first instance or as to day-to-day trading in the security.
uranium exploration and those with the foresight to be looking for uranium had difficulty in financing exploration activities. The author bears witness as he acknowledges
that as a member of the staff he shared a generally pessimistic view about the possibility
of finding significant uranium deposits in the United States. Commencing in 1953 and
extending at least through 1957 significant discoveries of uranium were made to the extent that the problem became one of a threat of uranium becoming a glut on the market.
A speculative frenzy took place between 1954 and 1958 which the Commission was powerless to curb despite much rhetoric to the contrary. As the Atomic Energy Commission
changed its policies with respect to the purchase of uranium and the prophets of gloom
took over between 1960 and 1965, it became virtually impossible to finance uranium exploration. However, a breakthrough in reactor technology that became apparent about
1965 led to renewed activity in uranium company stocks ultimately joined in by some
institutional investors seeking exceptional performance that took stocks of many companies to unrealistic highs through 1967 and 1968. With a general slackening in securities
markets accompanied by adverse publicity concerning reactor safety, nuclear pollution
and the like, investors in uranium stocks took another bath in the late 1969's and through
1970. At every phase the Commission's staff was there to accent the adverse factors and
mute the favorable, contributing to the marketplace's inability to view uranium exploration through an objective perspective.
174 Prior proposals have been in terms of segregation of the dealer and broker function and, if implemented, would have limited the activities of integrated firms. Thus,
the Commission in 1936 posed one of the critical issues raised by this article: "A broker
who trades for his own account .. . may furnish his customers with investment advice
inspired less by any consideration of their needs than by the exigencies of his own

position .... ." SEC, REPORT

ON THE FEASIBILITY AND ADvIsABILITY OF THE COMPLETE
SEGREGATION OF THE FUNCIONS OF D.ALER AND BROKER xvi (1936). See 2 Loss 1215. The

foregoing report to Congress was made pursuant to a direction contained in section 11(c)
of the Exchange Act as initially adopted. See also Bloomenthal, supra note 21, at 220.
175 Compare the settlement accepted by the Commission under which the underwriting department of a large broker-dealer proposed to insulate confidential information
received in the course of preparing an underwriting from other departments and providing for the one-way transmission of information from the research department to the
underwriting department, in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., SEC Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8459 (Nov. 25, 1968).
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Perhaps, exemption from the segregation requirement should be
conditioned upon adequate assurance of a one-way flow of information
from the research group to the trading department but otherwise insisting on the insulation of the two departments. 116
We have seen that utilization of the shell corporation and spin-off
corporations is sometimes an attempt to obtain access to a trading market. Specific regulation of access to such markets is badly needed in this
area. For starters, the author would suggest a rule making it unlawful
for a broker-dealer to request and/or accept any consideration direct
or indirect for making a market or placing quotations in the sheets
(or other quotation system) for a security. Such a rule is not intended
to facilitate access to secondary markets although conceivably it
could do so by eliminating the type of motivation that often underlies such decisions today. Segregation of the wholesale and retail phases
of the securities industry is likely to further limit access of issuers to
a secondary market, as often such access is based upon the need of a
particular market-maker for a commodity to merchandise. However,
the economic need for such access does not justify practices with such
potential for mischief. 177 The problem of limited access to secondary
markets also underlies the controlled and dominated market.
It is time that someone commenced thinking about a "fourth
market"17 8 for the trading in securities of relatively unseasoned com170 Mr. Robert Trone, head of the research department of Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith is recently quoted by The New York Times as describing his job as one
of providing "merchandise" for the firm's customers. That recommendations are influenced by trading information (although purportedly for benign reasons) is demonstrated
by his statement: "We must be very careful, due to our size, our market impact, our
buying power. We have to avoid recommending companies with a very small floating
supply of stock." N.Y. Times, March 5, 1971, at 49, col. 4 & at 57, col. 6.
177 Thus, the author places himself on the Ferber side in the Ferber vs. Manne dispute concerning the role "moral" as distinguished from economic values play in the area
of securities regulation. See Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VANn. L.
RE:v. 547 (1970); Ferber, The Case Against Insider Trading: A Response to ProfessorManne,
id. at 621; Manne, A Rejoinder to Mr. Ferber, id. at 627. An environment that accepts

such economic inducement for making a market in a security, contains the seeds of its
own destruction by ultimately destroying investor confidence.
178 Used by the author to distinguish it from the "third market," a term employed
to describe trading (generally in large blocks) of listed securities off the exchange (that is,
in the over-the-counter market). Presumably, this "fourth market" would have a large
number of prospective applicants if there are, in fact, approximately 50,000 securities
traded in the over-the-counter market of which only 20,000 (and initially only 3,000)
are to be quoted on the NASD's automated quotation system. See note 7 supra. As of
June 30, 1970, 2,980 issuers had securities listed on a national securities exchange; 3,963
issuers had registered securities under section 12(g) of the Exchange Act and an additional 2,414 issuers were subject to the reporting requirements of section 15(d) of the
Exchange Act. 36 SEC ANN. REP. 42 (1970). Compare the Commission's recent proposal
that generally it would attempt by means yet to be determined to achieve a single cen-
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panies. Access to this market should be conditioned upon making
basic information concerning the company available to the marketplace. Any company can pay such price with less serious consequences
and ramifications than making a deal with a broker-dealer involving
a shell corporation or other questionable practices. Perhaps, we need
a subsidized, computerized marketplace administered by a public
corporation in which transactions take place only on an agency auction
basis much as on an exchange for securities of this type which after
appropriate seasoning may graduate to the ordinary markets. The
public subsidy necessary to maintain such a market could be substantially less than the costs of policing the present markets in these securities and the costs paid by the duped public.
CONCLUSION

The federal securities laws contain registration and disclosure
requirements; antifraud provisions and anti-manipulation provisions.
Some effort is made in this article to see these provisions whole from
the perspective of a free competitive securities market. Our ramblings
have led to a plea for some long overdue structural changes in overthe-counter securities markets - to wit: (a) establishing ground
rules for access to secondary markets; (b) segregating the wholesale
and retail phases of the over-the-counter market and (c) establishing
a public corporation which would provide a marketplace for unseasoned
securities until such securities are ready to graduate to established
markets. The need for reform of the securities markets is great and
the timing is right as the securities industry is going through a period
of reevaluation. Some of the problems discussed in this article are
likely to be shunted aside by the self-regulators; nonetheless, they demand attention as they raise fundamental questions of corruption
which can over a period of time eat away public confidence in
securities markets. The Commission has under consideration some of
the problems posed pertaining to market-makers, but unfortunately
tralized market for all securities open to all qualified persons. Letter dated March 10,
1971 to Congress transmitting the Institutional Investor Study Report. See BNA SECURITIES REGULATION 8 LAw REPORT, Mar. 10, 1971, at 23-25 (extra ed.). Presumably, the
author's "fourth market" could be a part of such an undertaking or a pilot program
as it recognizes that the reason market-makers exist in the over-the-counter market is the
fact that there is no central clearing market at which orders can be matched. The Commission itself has hedged, suggesting that even in a centralized market it may be necessary
to preserve a strong dealer function to offset temporary imbalances in the marketplace.
Id. at 25.
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the approach under consideration is largely in terms of disclosure'7 9
which it has been suggested in this Article is not adequate.
179 The Commission is said to be presently engaged in consideration of the advisability of adopting rules "on disclosure of the fact of market making, to delineate the extent
and time of disclosure to be required, and whether distinctions should be made as, for instance, between situations where the particular broker-dealer is the sole or dominant
market-maker and situations where it is one of a number of market-makers and the price
is competitive with quotes of other market-makers .... " Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
CCH F -. SEc. L. RE:P. 92,962, at 90,559. The author would suggest that it is time for
the Commission to rethink some of the problems that concerned Congress in 1934 as reflected by section 11(e) of the Exchange Act directing the Commission to study this area.
See note 175 supra. As Professor Loss has noted, the alternative of separating the dealer
and brokerage function was not considered in the 1963 Special Study Report. 5 Loss 3242.

